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   Introduction
 
A meaningful encounter between two parties does not change
only the weaker or the stronger party, but both at once. We should
expect the same from any encounter between deconstruction and
justice. It might be tempting for advocates of deconstruction to hope
that deconstruction would offer new insights into problems of justice,
or, more boldly, to assert that "the question of justice" can never be
the same after the assimilation of deconstructive insights. But, as a
deconstructionist myself, I am naturally skeptical of all such blanket
pronouncements, even - or perhaps especially - pronouncements
about the necessary utility and goodness of deconstructive practice.
Instead, in true deconstructive fashion, I would rather examine how
deconstructionists' claims of what they are doing - which are often
refused the name of "theory" or "method" -are uncannily altered by
their encounter with questions of justice. In fact, as I hope to show,
when deconstruction focuses on specific and concrete questions of
justice, we will discover that deconstruction has always been
something quite different from what most people thought it to be.
When I first began to write about deconstruction and law, I
faced the task of translating deconstructive arguments in philosophy
and literature to the concerns of law and justice. In the process, I
proposed an understanding of deconstruction that enabled it to be
employed in a critical theory of law. I fully recognized then that, in
translating the insights of deconstructionists to the study of law, I was
also working a transformation - for to translate is to iterate, and
     1 See J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96
Yale L.J. 743, 745 & n.8, 761 n.56 (1987) (comparing the account of
legal deconstruction to a translation or alteration of it, and offering it
as a dangerous supplement to Derridean deconstruction).
     2 See Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 Texas L. Rev.
1627, 1695 (1991) ("This is not Derrida, and it is not
deconstruction."); see also Pierre Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte, C'est
Moi": The Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction,
11 Cardozo L. Rev. 1631, 1641-42 (1990). 
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iterability alters. 1 Not surprisingly, I was subsequently accused of
misunderstanding both Derrida and deconstruction, and of
emphasizing a logocentric version of deconstruction that
misinterpreted Derrida's texts and subverted and undermined "true"
or "proper" deconstructive practice.2
There is a certain irony to this accusation - the subversion of
a putatively "orthodox" or properly performed deconstruction by a
closet logocentrist. Yet it must be true, mustn't it, that there is a better
and a worse way to engage in deconstructive argument? After all,
deconstructive arguments are studied in departments of philosophy
and comparative literature, and tests are given, and Ph.D. theses
written, and degrees awarded, on the basis of this assumption. Aren't
these tests graded as better or worse, and aren't these theses subjected
to examination and sent back for revisions? How could one make
sense of what deconstructionists do if there were not a better and a
worse way to understand and perform deconstructive arguments?
Surely it cannot be the case that "everything goes," where the
determination of what is or is not a better use or understanding of
deconstruction is concerned.
Nevertheless, I shall short-circuit this deconstructive
quandary, which is potentially interminable. I plead guilty to the
charge. If one is to adapt deconstruction to the critical study of law,
the practice of deconstruction must, in fact, be altered, changed,
modified, and, I would even say, improved. Certain features of
Derrida's texts, for example, must be emphasized and others
deemphasized and regarded as mistaken. Only in this way can
deconstructive argument be made a useful tool of critical analysis.
Only in this way can it escape the many criticisms of nihilism that
have been leveled at it.
     3 For a discussion, see J.M. Balkin, Tradition, Betrayal, and the
Politics of Deconstruction, 11 Cardozo L. Rev. 1613, 1619-20 (1990).
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How logocentric of me.
So, I freely confess, I am a traitor to deconstruction. Yet, as
we know, "traitor" and "tradition" come from the same root: The
traditionalist hands down, while the traitor hands over. In both cases
there is a passing off, a changing. (Yet the ambiguities continue: one
can pass off a baton, as in a relay race, or pass off counterfeit money
or goods.) The traitor-traditionalist distinction, with all of its
accompanying uncertainties, is surely one of the most interesting for
a deconstructionist. 3 There is an important sense in which I am
continuing in the tradition of deconstructive argument even as I am
insufficiently deconstructive by the standards of a purportedly "pure,"
"orthodox," "properly performed" deconstruction. If every
traditionalist is also, in   some sense, a traitor to what she preserves
in the name of tradition - by altering it, freezing it in time, sucking the
life out of it, and substituting the dry husk of unthinking imitation -
might not every traitor also be, in some sense yet to be determined, a
traditionalist of the first order?   
As a traitor, however, I have an even greater satisfaction. As
time has passed, Derrida himself has followed my perfidy. He has left
the ranks of his apostles and joined the ranks of the apostates. His
encounter with justice has brought him to many of the same
conclusions about the meaning and use of deconstruction I have
offered. So perhaps I was following him all along, in following the
direction in which he later followed me. Perhaps I agreed with him all
along, in agreeing with that with which he would later agree. Who is
the traitor, and who the traditionalist now?
A key deconstructive idea is that iterability, or the capacity to
be repeated in new contexts, results in change. Nevertheless, in
examining how repetition is linked to change, we must always keep
in mind two possible explanations, two different paths of explanation.
The first claims that what we understand later really is different from
the original and is consequently an improvement or a falling away.
The second claims that this repeated thing has really always been the
same; the new context has merely altered our understanding of it,
with a consequent improvement or falling away of that understanding.
Often it is very difficult to tell which claim we are making. It is often
     4 Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The "Mystical Foundation of
Authority," 11 Cardozo L. Rev. 919 (1990) (Mary Quaintance trans.).
A slightly different version of this essay appears in Deconstruction
and the Possibility of Justice 3 (Drucilla Cornell et al. eds., 1992).
     5 Derrida, supra note 4, at 935.
     6 Id. at 929 (listing various writings on Levinas, Hegel, Freud,
Kafka, Nelson Mandela, and the Declaration of Independence).
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unclear whether we are traditionalists, who preserve the old in new
guises and new understandings, or betrayers, who offer only an
altered, imperfect substitute. After all, everyone is familiar with
sectarian disputes between competing groups of believers - whether
religious, political, or academic - who offer competing interpretations
concerning the common object of their belief, branding their
opponents as traitors while describing themselves as keepers of the
faith.
It is this type of perfidy (which is at the same time a form of
faithfulness), this alteration of deconstruction (which is at the same
time not an alteration) that I would like to discuss here.
Of course, a deconstructionist must have texts to work with,
texts to make her argument with. I take as my texts three writings by
Jacques Derrida. The first is a lecture he gave in 1989 at a conference
at the Cardozo Law School on "Deconstruction and the Possibility of
Justice." This talk was later published under the title Force of Law:
"The Mystical Foundation of Authority". 4 In this address, he an
swered critics who accused deconstruction of nihilism or (perhaps
worse) political quietism and complete irrelevance to questions of
justice. Derrida replied that, far from failing to address the question
of justice, deconstruction had addressed little else. 5 As evidence he
listed a series of recent articles he had written that, in his opinion,
concerned questions of justice. 6
Of course, from a deconstructionist's standpoint, what might
be most interesting about this list are the articles that Derrida did not
choose to mention. One might think that these articles were withheld
because they were wholly irrelevant to questions of justice. After all,
in several of the writings that Derrida does mention, it takes quite a
     7 See, for example, Jacques Derrida, Glas (1974), whose subject
matter has never precisely been determined.
     8 Jacques Derrida, Biodegradables: Seven Diary Fragments, 15
Critical Inquiry 812 (1989) (Peggy Kamuf trans.) hereinafter Derrida,
Biodegradables; Jacques Derrida, Like the Sound of the Sea Deep
Within a Shell: Paul de Man's War, 14 Critical Inquiry 590 (1988)
(Peggy Kamuf trans.) hereinafter Derrida, Paul de Man's War.
     9 For various accounts, see David Lehman, Signs of the Times:
Deconstruction and the Fall of Paul de Man (1991); Responses: On
Paul de Man's Wartime Journalism (Werner Hamacher et al. eds.,
1989) hereinafter Responses.
     10 See Werner Hamacher et al., Paul de Man, a Chronology,
1919-49 in Responses, supra note 9, at xiii. Members of the Belgian
public derisively referred to the captured institution as Le Soir vole
("The Stolen Evening"). Id.
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stretch to see them as directly addressing the question of justice. 7 A
fortiori, the articles not mentioned must be even more divorced from
these issues. Yet no deconstructionist worth her salt would accept
such an obvious attempt at marginalization so readily; it would be
like waving a red flag in front of a bull. Let us look, then, at the
discarded, irrelevant parts of the Derridean corpus. Among them we
find two substantial pieces on the controversy surrounding Paul de
Man's wartime journalism. 8
The basic story surrounding this scandal is by now well
known. 9 Paul de Man, Sterling Professor of Comparative Literature
at Yale University, was a close friend of Jacques Derrida and one of
the central figures in the development of literary deconstruction. He
died in 1983, a beloved and respected teacher and scholar. In 1987,
a young graduate student doing research for a thesis on de Man
discovered articles de Man had written between 1940 and 1942 for
the Belgian newspaper Le Soir. During the Nazi occupation of
Belgium, Le Soir was seized by pro-German forces and used as a
mouthpiece for pro-Nazi propaganda and antisemitic statements. 10
De Man wrote for Le Soir during that period. He was still in his early
twenties. Some of his   articles were exclusively literary, while others
were in various degrees concerned with politics. Moreover, as Derrida
himself puts it, the "massive, immediate, and dominant effect" of de
     11 Derrida, Paul de Man's War, supra note 8, at 607 (emphasis
omitted). Derrida offers the same formula in Derrida, Biodegradables,
supra note 8, at 822, as proof that he was not underplaying the
malignancy of de Man's writings.
     12 Paul de Man, Les Juifs dans la Litterature Actuelle, Le Soir,
Mar. 4, 1941, at 1.
     13 Derrida, Paul de Man's War, supra note 8.
     14 Derrida, Biodegradables, supra note 8.
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Man's political articles conformed to the "official rhetoric ... of the
occupation forces." 11 And one article in particular, The Jews in
Contemporary Literature, 12 is overtly antisemitic. 
The revelation of these writings created a furor in the academy
over de Man's posthumous reputation, the relation of his past writings
to his later academic work, and the possible relationship between de
Man's wartime activities and the normative claims - or lack of
normative claims - of deconstruction. Many silly and intemperate
accusations were leveled on all sides of this dispute. In the midst of
this controversy, Derrida wrote two substantial articles. In the first,
The Sound of the Deep Sea Within a Shell: Paul de Man's War, 13 he
defends his old friend - and deconstruction itself - from what he
regards as unjust accusation, and he tries to place de Man's life and
works in their proper perspective. In the second, Biodegradables: Six
Literary Fragments, 14 he responds to six critics of the previous essay.
Here he defends not only de Man and deconstruction, but also
himself, from what he regards as unjust treatment and unfair
criticism. 
 One can agree or disagree with Derrida's particular stance on
these issues. Nevertheless, it is hard to argue that these articles do not
raise, on every line of every page, issues of justice, responsibility, and
fair treatment. Their major concerns are how one should judge de
Man, deconstruction, and Derrida himself, and how various critics
have fairly or unfairly treated them. The question of responsibility
overhangs the entire discussion - responsibility for the Holocaust,
responsibility for collaboration, responsibility for one's silence about
collaboration, responsibility in reading the work of another person,
and responsibility in judging another's life and works.
     15 See Symposium, On Jacques Derrida's "Paul de Man's War," 15
Critical Inquiry 765 (1989).
 
     16 Derrida, supra note 4, at 949.
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Posed in the often byzantine setting of academic disputes and
academic reputations, these articles concern the most concrete
questions of justice and raise the most impassioned prose from
Derrida. Indeed, the second article borders on the polemical. They
stand in marked contrast to the relatively abstract pronouncements on
justice and re  sponsibility Derrida offers in his Cardozo Law School
address, Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority.
Thus, it is all the more puzzling that Derrida did not think to
list these essays in his catalogue of examples of deconstruction's
encounter with justice. Derrida could hardly have forgotten them, for
they had only recently been published when he gave his address at
Cardozo. Nor could he have expected that his audience would not
know about them, for they were published in a well-known literary
journal; indeed the first article had attracted considerable controversy
and led to a symposium of critiques in which the second appeared as
a response. 15 Nor can one object that these two articles do not discuss
deconstruction or employ deconstructive techniques. In fact, both
possess interesting and sustained discussions of deconstruction and
its place in the academy, as well as many passages explicitly offering
and rejecting possible connections between deconstruction and
justice, or between deconstruction on the one hand and fascism or
totalitarianism on the other. 
Perhaps one might think that these articles are not worthy of
mention precisely because they are so concerned with a particular
event, and therefore lack universalizability. Yet, as Derrida himself
reminds us in his Cardozo address, justice is always addressed to
events and persons in all of their singularity. 16 What better way, one
might think, to discover what Derrida really thinks about justice than
to study his remarks concerning an issue about which he feels the
most deeply, which gets him, as the saying goes, "where he lives"?
We often witness people speaking abstractly, in high sounding
phrases, about what is just and what is good. Yet, one might believe,
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we only see what they really think about these matters when they are
faced with a concrete question of justice that truly affects them. So I
read these three texts together - the abstract disposition on justice
with the more concrete discussions of the de Man controversy. The
first is sedate, the others brimming with anger and anguish. The
relationship of deconstruction to justice lies somewhere in the
conversation between them.    
Of course, there is a sense, too, in which even the more
abstract Cardozo Law School address, which nowhere explicitly
mentions de Man, is motivated by and concerns the de Man
controversy. For by the late 1980s this scandal had raised anew
accusations that deconstruction was the easy refuge of nihilists or
those without values or conscience, that a doctrine that found
complications of meaning in all   texts was tailor-made for
collaborationists with evil, unscrupulous opportunists, or simply
weak-willed souls unable to commit to a just course of action when
faced with obstacles or uncertainties. Thus, when Derrida rose to
address the audience at the Cardozo Law School in the fall of 1989 -
which was also the fall of the 1980s - it was all the more important to
establish that deconstruction was not, nor had it ever been, nihilistic,
opposed to justice, or even (God forbid) unconcerned with justice, but
that it was, quite the contrary, fully committed to the critique of
injustice and the creation of a more just world. Deconstruction,
Derrida hoped to convince his audience, could properly be used for
beneficial purposes of social and cultural critique, and indeed, it was
perhaps most correctly used for such purposes. 
Yet, in rising to respond to these critics, just as he had
previously responded to the critics of de Man, Derrida offered
examples of deconstructive argument that were not wholly consistent
with all of his previous deconstructive writings. They are, however,
consistent with the practice of deconstruction that I have advocated.
This is Derrida's perfidy, his betrayal of deconstruction. Yet it is a
betrayal that I heartily endorse. 
In these essays, Derrida offers four different statements of the
possible connection between deconstruction and justice. First,
deconstruction can call into question the boundaries that determine
who is a proper subject of justice -that is, to whom justice is owed.
     17 Id. at 953.
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Second, deconstruction demands "a responsibility without limits." 17
Third, deconstruction requires one to address the Other in the
language of the Other. Fourth, deconstruction is opposed to all
intellectual forms of totalitarianism, and hence, by analogy, to
political totalitarianism as well.    
Like Derrida, I am also concerned with deconstruction's
possible relationship to justice. In this essay, I offer an extended
critique of Derrida's views in order to make two basic points about
the relationship between justice and deconstruction. First, Derrida
offers deconstructive arguments that cut both ways: Although one can
use deconstructive arguments to further what Derrida believes is just,
one can also deconstruct in a different way to reach conclusions he
would probably find very unjust. One can also question his careful
choice of targets of deconstruction: One could just as easily have
chosen different targets and, by deconstructing them, reach
conclusions that he would find abhorrent. Thus, in each case, what
makes Derrida's deconstructive argument an argument for justice is
not its use of   deconstruction, but the selection of the particular text
or concept to deconstruct and the way in which the particular
deconstructive argument is wielded. I shall argue that Derrida's
encounter with justice really shows that deconstructive argument is
a species of rhetoric, which can be used for different purposes
depending upon the moral and political commitments of the
deconstructor. 
Second, and equally important, Derrida's use of deconstructive
argument to critique existing arrangements as unjust presumes belief
in an idea of justice that may be indeterminate but is not reducible to
any conventional notion of justice. Derrida's arguments simply make
no sense unless he is relying on a transcendent idea of justice, which
human law only imperfectly articulates. Moreover, I shall argue, he
admits this, albeit only tentatively and haltingly, in his more recent
writings on deconstruction. 
Derrida's resistance to such a recognition is altogether
understandable. A postulation of transcendent human values brings
us a long way from the philosophical conception Derrida offered in
     18 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (Gayatri C. Spivak trans.,
Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1976) (1967).
     19 Id. at 158 (emphasis omitted).
     20 Plato, Republic, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato 575 (Edith
Hamilton & Huntington Cairns eds., Bollingen Foundation 1961)
hereinafter Collected Dialogues (Paul Shorey trans., 1930).
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Of Grammatology. 18 There he argued against the very existence of a
"transcendental signified" and made his famous statement that "there
is nothing outside of the text." 19 Nevertheless, I believe that a
transformation of deconstruction becomes inevitable when
deconstructionists begin to confront real questions of justice and
injustice. If deconstruction can have salutary effects for the study of
legal theory, there are equally salutary effects that law can have for
deconstruction. So, I argue, when we try to make sense of Derrida's
arguments about law and justice and read them charitably to avoid
confusing and self-contradictory interpretations, we arrive at an
important variant of deconstructive practice, which relies on the
existence of human values that transcend any given culture. For want
of a better name, I shall call this type of deconstruction transcendental
deconstruction. It is the form of deconstruction I have advocated in
my own work. 
 A belief in transcendent values is often associated with the
tradition of Platonism. However, the view I am concerned with is not
the Platonism of the Republic. 20 It does not assert the existence of
eternal and unchanging Ideas that exist in a Platonic Heaven. It does
not postulate normative standards of determinate content. Rather, it
is   concerned with those indeterminate values or urges located in the
human soul, which human beings articulate through positive morality
and cultural conventions, and which nevertheless always escape this
articulation.    
Surprisingly enough, the origins of this nonplatonic
transcendentalism also lie in Plato's work. Plato came to a similar
view after he had written the Republic, in later dialogues like the
     21 Plato, Statesman, in Collected Dialogues, supra note 20, at 1018
(J.B. Skemp trans., 1952).
     22 Plato, Sophist, in Collected Dialogues, supra note 20, at 957
(Francis M. Cornford trans., 1935).
     23 Plato, Laws, in Collected Dialogues, supra note 20, at 1225
(A.E. Taylor trans., 1934).
     24 Here I draw on the excellent discussion in T.K. Seung, Intuition
and Construction: The Foundation of Normative Theory 175-211
(1993).
     25 T.K. Seung, Kant's Platonic Revolution (forthcoming 1994).
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Statesman, 21 Sophist, 22 and particularly the Laws. 23 He abandoned
his earlier dreams of political perfection for a more democratic,
skeptical vision. 24 By the time of the Laws, Plato realized that our
idea of justice is inchoate and indeterminate. It is a mere skeleton; it
must be fleshed out in the world of culture. For this reason, we must
construct a conception of justice using our human values and
intuitions. T.K. Seung has called this approach "platonic
constructivism"; he argues that it is a substantial modification of the
more familiar Platonism we recall from the Republic. 25 But Seung's
constructivism has a curious consequence: The articulation of our
values in human culture, law, and convention makes these concrete
articulations different from the inchoate values they articulate. It is
this gap or discrepancy that deconstructive argument seizes upon as
the basis for its critique. The essence of what I am calling
transcendental deconstruction, then, is to note the interval between
the human capacity for judgment and evaluation that inevitably and
necessarily transcends the creations of culture, and the prescriptions
and evaluations of that culture, which in turn articulate and exemplify
human values like justice. It is in this sense that transcendental
deconstruction depends, as Platonism itself does, on a conception of
values that "go beyond" the positive norms of culture and convention.
But these transcendent values do not come to us in a fully determinate
form; they need culture to turn their inchoate sense into an articulated
conception. And these transcendent values do not exist in an
imaginary Platonic Heaven; they exist rather in the wellsprings of the
human soul.
12
 The idea of values that "transcend" culture might suggest that
when human beings evaluate they do so from a place outside culture.
 But it is difficult to make sense of this claim, because culture helps
constitute us as individuals. Thus, standing outside of culture would
be like standing outside of ourselves. We can only express our values
through their articulations in culture. How, then, is it possible to
speak of transcendent human values when the ways we express our
values must always be immanent in culture? How can values be both
immanent and transcendent?
  To understand how values can be transcendent, we must
recognize that value is properly a verb, not a noun. People do not
"have" values as if they were objects that could be kept in their
pockets. Rather, they possess an inexhaustible drive to evaluate - to
name the beautiful and the ugly, the better and the worse. This feature
of human evaluation is poorly captured by our standard metaphors of
value. These are metaphors of determinate measurement: Values
work like scales or rulers, and to evaluate is to measure. These
metaphors have two important conceptual entailments: The first is
that a value provides a fixed standard of measurement; the second is
that there is a necessary separation between the value that measures
and the thing measured. If a value is a standard of measure, it must be
determinate just as a ruler is of a determinate length. Moreover, it
must exist separately from the thing it measures. One cannot use a
ruler to measure itself any more than one can use a balance to weigh
itself. Hence, the metaphor of measurement leads us to assume that
values can be transcendent only if they somehow exist as determinate
standards apart from the culture that they measure. This leads to
Plato's ontology, and, I submit, to Plato's error. 
Instead we must consider a contrasting metaphor of value -
that of an indeterminate urge or demand. Instead of viewing values as
determinate standards of measurement, we should understand them
as a sort of insatiable and inchoate drive to evaluate. Because they are
inchoate they can never be made fully determinate; because they are
insatiable they can never be fully satisfied.  Our values are like an
inexhaustible yearning for something that cannot clearly and fully be
described; hence our values always demand more of us than we can
ever satisfy, despite our best efforts. 
Thus, we have two metaphorical accounts of value: one of
determinate measurement, and one of indeterminate longing. Each is
helpful in its own way, but neither can be usefully employed in all
     26 I borrow this expression from T.K. Seung. Id.
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contexts and circumstances. To understand the phenomenon of
transcendence we must recognize the metaphor of measurement as a
metaphor, and exchange it for a different one. 
The metaphor of value as an insatiable urge or demand offers
a   more plausible account of how our values are transcendent and
why our articulations of them are imperfect. Under the metaphor of
measurement, our institutions fail to be just because they are
imperfect representations of a determinate standard of justice; this
standard is transcendent because it exists separate and apart from
culture. Thus, virtue is a matter of copying, and the virtuous person
is a good copyist. Under the contrasting metaphor, values are inchoate
yearnings that we attempt to articulate through our cultural
constructions. To be just we must construct examples of justice using
the indeterminate urge for justice as our goad rather than as our guide.
This means that the virtuous person is not a good copyist but a good
architect. She attempts to satisfy her sense of justice by constructing
just institutions. Nevertheless, she responds to an indefinite and
indeterminate value. This has two consequences. First, there will be
many different ways of constructing a just institution, depending upon
the situation in which she finds herself and the resources she has
available to her. Second, her constructed example of justice will
never exhaust the insatiable longings of human value. Thus, human
cultural creations will always fail to be perfectly just, but not because
they are defective copies of a determinate standard. Their
imperfection arises from the necessary inadequation that must exist
between an indeterminate and inexhaustible urge and any concrete
and determinate articulation of justice. This relationship of
inadequacy between culture and value is what we mean by
"transcendence." The goal of transcendental deconstruction is to
rediscover this transcendence where it has been forgotten.
  Some people have thought that deconstruction is aimless;
that it has no goal or purpose. Others have argued that at best its goal
is the mindless destruction and annihilation of all conceptual
distinctions. Neither charge applies to the form of deconstructive
practice I advocate here. Transcendental deconstruction has a goal; its
goal is not destruction but rectification. 26 The deconstructor critiques
for the purpose of betterment; she seeks out unjust or inappropriate
     27 For a defense of this normative approach to deconstruction, see
J.M. Balkin, Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject
and the Problem of Legal Coherence, 103 Yale L.J. 105, 124-27
(1993).
     28 Here one must be sensitive to the possibility that my assessment
of Derrida applies with equal force to me: Repetition of older
arguments in new contexts may have produced changes in views that
I claim always to have held.
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conceptual hierarchies in order to assert a better ordering. 27 Hence,
her argument is always premised on the possibility of an alternative
to existing norms that is not simply different, but also more just, even
if the results of this deconstruction are imperfect and subject to
further deconstruction. Such a deconstruction assumes that it is
possible to speak meaningfully of the more or the less just; it
decidedly rejects the claim   that nothing is more just than anything
else, or that all things are equally just. Rather than effacing the
distinction between the just and unjust, it attempts to reveal the
mistaken identification of justice with an inadequate articulation of
justice in human culture and law.    
If this analysis is sound, deconstructive argument becomes
something quite different from what most of its critics (and even
some of its adherents) have imagined. Now deconstructive argument
is premised on the assumption of transcendent yet only imperfectly
realizable values of justice and truth. The practice of deconstructive
argument may be skeptical about the perfection of any and every
particular example of justice, but it is decidedly not nihilistic. Indeed,
it is a deconstruction founded on faith - faith in human values which,
although only articulable through culture, surpass and hence act as a
perpetual admonition to culture. This is the type of deconstructive
practice I have advocated, and the one that makes the most sense
when applied to law and political theory. 
Jacques Derrida, I shall argue, has gradually come around to
a similar view, although he would not perhaps use the term
transcendental to describe it. Yet it is an inevitable consequence of
the connections he now wishes to draw between deconstruction and
justice. Moreover, he has begun to insist that something like this is
what he always had in mind by deconstruction. 28 Is this an adequate
description of his project or a specious substitution? Is this tradition
     29 Derrida, supra note 4, at 951-53.
     30 Id. at 953-55.
     31 Id. at 951.
     32 Id.
     33 Id.
     34 Id.
     35 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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or betrayal? That is for the reader to judge.   
   I. Deconstruction and the Subjects of Justice
 
The first connection between justice and deconstruction that
Derrida hopes to demonstrate concerns the definition of who is a
subject of justice, that is, who can be treated justly or unjustly.
Throughout Western civilization, Derrida argues, the category of
subjects of justice has been limited. 29 Deconstruction furthers justice,
he insists, because it calls these limitations into question. 30  
Derrida argues that Western civilization has traditionally
considered justice and injustice to be concepts that apply only to
persons, in particular to persons who possess the capability of
language. 31 These are persons whom one can speak to - and hence
reason with. "One   would not speak of injustice or violence toward
an animal, even less toward a vegetable or a stone." 32 For example,
"an animal can be made to suffer, but we would never say, in a sense
considered proper, that it is a wronged subject, the victim of a crime
... and this is true a fortiori, we think, for what we call vegetable or
mineral or intermediate species like the sponge." 33 Indeed, Derrida
continues, throughout human history "there have been, there still are
many "subjects' among mankind who are not yet recognized as
subjects and who receive this animal treatment ...." 34 To treat a
person as an animal - that is, one who is incapable of being addressed
in language - is to consider that person's treatment not to be a
question of justice or injustice. This argument reminds one of Chief
Justice Taney's famous assertion in Dred Scott v. Sandford 35 that
     36 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407.
     37 Derrida, supra note 4, at 951.
     38 As Derrida puts it:
 
A deconstructionist approach to the boundaries that institute
the human subject (preferably and paradigmatically the adult
male, rather than the woman, child or animal) as the measure
of the just and the unjust, does not necessarily lead to
injustice, nor to the effacement of an opposition between just
and unjust but may, in the name of a demand more insatiable
16
blacks "had no rights which the white man was bound to respect." 36
Derrida even suggests that the primitive tradition of animal sacrifice
confirmed and supported the notion of a separation between human
subjects - who can speak and are the subjects and objects of just and
unjust treatment - and "animals" who, by the logic of this opposition,
are not capable of being treated unjustly. 37   
The boundaries of justice, in other words, are determined by
the boundaries of who is "human" as opposed to who is merely an
"animal" - that is, one without language or, alternatively, without a
recognized right to speak. Yet these boundaries and the justifications
for these boundaries can be deconstructed, even to the point, as some
animal rights activists would maintain, of calling into question the
exclusion of animal life from questions of justice. At this point the
distinction between "human" and "animal" would no longer serve to
distinguish subjects of justice from nonsubjects; we would have to
invent a new distinction. 
Thus, Derrida argues, the opposition "subject of justice"
versus "nonsubject of justice" is unstable. Because of its instability,
it may continually be questioned, and the criteria that separate the
subjects of justice from those nonsubjects - earlier identified by the
distinction between "humans" and "animals" - must continually be
revised. Hence, Derrida wants to insist, deconstruction is relevant to
justice because we can deconstruct the boundaries of who is
considered a   "person" or, more generally, a proper subject of justice.
By challenging these boundaries, we can move from a world in which
the conception of a subject of justice is wrongfully limited to one in
which it receives a just expansion. 38   
than justice, lead to a reinterpretation of the whole apparatus
of boundaries within which a history and a culture have been
able to confine their criteriology.
 
Id. at 953.
     39 Id. at 971.
     40 Cf. id. at 953 (emphasis added).
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In this way, Derrida insists, the use of deconstruction might
not lead to nihilism or injustice. Instead deconstruction would form
part of a progressive project that sought increasingly to expand
political rights to those other than white male European human beings
by deconstructing the boundaries of who are and are not the proper
subjects of justice. As he says, in a slightly different context, "nothing
seems to me less outdated than the classical emancipatory ideal." 39
   These egalitarian sentiments are surely to be applauded. Yet Derrida
has not shown a necessary connection between deconstruction and
justice. He has merely pointed out that one might deconstruct certain
oppositions in a way that produces increasingly egalitarian
conclusions. He has not shown that these are the only oppositions one
might deconstruct. Nor has he shown that one can only deconstruct
these oppositions in a way that produces increasingly egalitarian
results.
 Derrida might have chosen to deconstruct or problematize the
distinction between justice and injustice, between liberty and slavery,
or between tolerance and bigotry. He does not do so. But nothing in
deconstructive theory - if such a thing exists - directs him or forbids
him from doing so. Deconstructive argument does not cease to
operate when the conclusions one might draw from it are
inegalitarian, although it is hardly surprising that Jacques Derrida sees
egalitarian consequences flowing from his use of deconstruction.
Indeed, this possibility is admitted by his very claim that
deconstruction "does not necessarily lead to injustice ... but may ...
lead to a reinterpretation" that is more just. 40 Derrida, like every good
deconstructor, picks his targets carefully. 
Moreover, even given the targets of his deconstruction - the
historically enforced oppositions between the subjects and
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nonsubjects of justice - Derrida has not shown that the only way in
which these   oppositions might be deconstructed leads to
increasingly just results. If deconstruction calls into question the
boundaries of subjects of justice, it does not follow that the only way
to question these boundaries is to advocate their expansion. They may
well be unstable, as Derrida insists. Yet their instability might be
evidence that they are about to implode, rather than expand.
Furthermore, even if there must be an expansion, one can expand the
boundary in two opposite directions - by expanding the scope of what
is assigned to the "human," who is a subject of justice, or by
expanding the scope of what is assigned to the "nonhuman," which is
not a proper subject of justice. In this way, the instability of these
boundaries might well be used, as it has in the past, to show that
blacks, or Asians, or women are not fully human beings, or that the
distinction between women and animals, for example, is so unstable
that it cannot fully be maintained. 
Indeed, one can understand the history of bigotry as the
continuous deconstruction of an imagined unity of humankind. It is
the perpetual claim that the unity of humankind is a pious fiction, a
papered-over discontinuity and heterogeneity, and that the Other
within this imagined unity must be located and understood in all of
its difference and inferiority. The egalitarian claims to rediscover the
true similarity of the subjects of justice by reclaiming those who were
wrongly grouped with nonsubjects; the bigot claims to rediscover the
true similarity of nonsubjects of justice by rejecting those who were
wrongly grouped with the subjects of justice. Both deconstruct
boundaries and categories, and the act of deconstruction does not
decide between them. 
One might also use deconstruction to show that the boundaries
of who may possess certain civil and political rights are unstable.
Thus, early American feminists argued that the expansion of political
rights to black males required the expansion of political rights to
women. However, a similar criticism applies here. The claim that the
current limitations of political rights - like the franchise or the right
to life - are unstable and that the justifications for these boundaries
are self-deconstructing may argue in favor of further restricting the
scope of these rights rather than expanding them. If the extension of
antidiscrimination laws to disabled persons cannot be squared with
the denial of such rights to homosexuals, then perhaps this result
counsels in the direction of shrinking the rights of the disabled rather
     41 116 U.S. 394 (1886).
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than expanding the rights of homosexuals. The strongly egalitarian
bias of the academy makes this an unthinkable position, but it is not
made unthinkable by any feature of "deconstructive theory." It is
made unthinkable   by the preexisting moral commitments of those
who make the deconstructive argument. 
If one begins with an egalitarian ideology, one can easily be
misled into thinking that the "emancipatory ideal" that Derrida
endorses is the same as deconstruction. But this assumption is based
on an implicit opposition or conceptual homology - namely, that
deconstruction is to logocentrism as emancipation is to slavery, or as
expansion of the subjects of justice is to contraction of the subjects of
justice. Of course, one of the most important deconstructive
techniques is the demonstration that the homology "A is to B as C is
to D" is reversible; one deconstructs ideologies by subverting the
conceptual homologies upon which they rest. My point is that this
technique can be performed as easily with the present set of
conceptual oppositions as with the opposition between speech and
writing in Of Grammatology. 
Furthermore, even if one accepted that deconstruction
necessarily led to an increased domain of subjects of justice, Derrida's
argument rests on the additional assumption that increasing the
number of subjects of justice increases justice. But it does not. The
second half of the nineteenth century saw two great expansions of the
domain of subjects of justice in the United States. The first was the
emancipation of the slaves and the bestowal of civil and political
rights upon them through the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments. The second came twenty years later in Santa Clara
County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 41 in which the U.S. Supreme
Court held that corporations were persons for purposes of the civil
and political rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. In
Derrida's terms, corporations too became subjects of justice, and
indeed, through the same constitutional amendment that granted civil
rights to blacks. The result of this decision was that corporations had
contract and property rights against other individuals that the courts
were constitutionally bound to enforce, and they did so with a
vengeance during America's Gilded Age, with results that today make
     42 I want to emphasize here that the granting of "personhood" and
even "citizenship" to corporations was originally designed to protect
the property interests of individuals who owned shares in a
corporation. To this extent, the expansion of corporate rights seems
a perfectly justifiable protection of individual property rights -
assuming always that the theorist in question believes that the basic
structure of economic rights is justified. It therefore furthers, rather
than detracts from, the "emancipatory ideal." However, one might
protect these individual property rights in ways other than by creating
a new legal subject with constitutional rights. The egalitarian critique,
as I understand it, is that the choice of this strategy has had
unexpected consequences that cannot all be explained as necessary to
protect the (just) rights of shareholders. To some degree the fiction of
the corporation as a person has taken on a life of its own and has been
used to work injustices and denials of individual rights. See, e.g.,
Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 87-90 (1938)
(Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that Santa Clara should be overruled);
C. Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech 220-21
(1991). For an examination of some of the alternative ways the issue
might have been conceptualized and the consequences of the Santa
Clara decision, see Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The
Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. Va. L. Rev. 173 (1985).
     43 See First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (striking
down limitations on corporate spending designed to influence voters).
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most economic egalitarians shudder. 42 The legacy of Santa Clara
continues to this   day: The Supreme Court has held that corporations
as constitutional "persons" have First Amendment speech rights like
those of private citizens. 43 This holding seems unexceptional but for
the fact that corporations usually have considerably more money and
therefore can exercise their speech rights more effectively than the
average citizen, through donations to political campaigns, purchase
of time and space on broadcast and print media, and so on. The
recognition and protection of corporate civil and political rights has
enabled corporations to convert huge concentrations of property
rights into concentrations of political power and thereby exercise
considerable control over the American political process. Not
surprisingly, some scholars on the left find these results to be perverse
     44 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Corporations and Free Speech, in The
Politics of Law 253 (David Kairys ed., 1982); cf. Owen M. Fiss, Why
the State?, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 787-91 (1987) (describing the
media's control of public debate and business's control of the political
process). Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has itself been somewhat
equivocal on the question of whether the scope of this First
Amendment right should be equal in all respects to the right enjoyed
by natural persons. See Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652 (1990). The question for Derrida, of course, is whether
further deconstruction of the boundary that excludes corporations
from full membership as "subjects of justice" would be a good thing
or a bad thing.
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and to represent a net loss of individual liberty. 44   
In recent times, one of the most pressing questions before the
American public has been the scope of the right to abortion.
Antiabortion activists have been on the forefront of expanding the
boundaries of personhood. One might almost believe that they were
taking their cue from Derrida, for their arguments are nothing if not
deconstructive: Effacing the distinction between fetus and child, they
have argued that fetuses are "babies" and doctors who perform
abortions are "baby killers." Insisting on the undecideability of any
boundaries (such as viability) between the person and the nonperson,
they have characterized the current law of the United States as the
most violent act of mass murder since the Holocaust. If, as Derrida
points out, justice and injustice have been reserved in Western culture
to the possessors of language, and if this reservation is itself in need
of destabilizing and deconstructing -in the case of animals, for
example - the contemporary antiabortion advocate can hardly be
faulted for seeing in this claim an argument for the protection of
defenseless fetuses, who lack the power of speech and are routinely
slaughtered by   those who possess this power. Everything that
Derrida says about the exclusion of animals from the domain of
justice, they might argue, could be said on behalf of the human fetus:
If a cat or a chimpanzee should be protected from torture or
vivisection, how much more so should the human fetus who likewise
lacks the power of speech, and who likewise is slaughtered for the
     45 See J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle Over
Meaning, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 869 (1993).
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benefit of those whom the state has already recognized as subjects of
justice -women? 
Needless to say, many women's groups and commentators on
the left (including, one assumes - although one does not know this for
certain - Derrida himself) would find such an argument abhorrent.
But is the argument abhorrent because it is not deconstructive or
rather because it is deconstructive - because nothing in
"deconstruction" prevents such an argument? Is the reason that a
feminist who employs deconstruction would not make such an
argument because deconstruction forbids it or because it conflicts
with her deeply held moral and political commitments - her sense of
the just and the unjust? In other words, isn't she really using
deconstructive argument to make sense of her existing commitments,
to articulate her values? 
In the examples of corporate speech, or the pros and cons of
abortion, we witness what I call "ideological drift" at work. 45 An
argument or principle that appears on its face to have determinate
political consequences turns out to bear a very different political
valence when it is inserted into new and unexpected contexts. Yet
because, as deconstruction itself reminds us, one cannot fully control
the contexts into which an argument or a claim can be inserted, one
cannot fully control its political valence in future situations. The
notion of ideological drift follows from the basic deconstructive point
that iterability alters. We have merely applied this point to the
practice of deconstructive argument itself. If the practices of
deconstruction by human beings are themselves subject to the insights
of deconstruction, this alteration seems inevitably to follow. The
practice of deconstruction by human beings must also be subject to
ideological drift. So is Derrida then hoisted on his own petard? If
what is called "deconstruction" is a rhetorical practice, a series of
arguments, a set of approaches that can be taught, repeated, iterated,
used again and again in different contexts, places, and times, all this
would seem to follow. Deconstruction, or more correctly
deconstructive arguments made by human beings, must be iterable in
ways that lead to both just and unjust results. 
  
     46 Derrida, supra note 4, at 953.
     47 Id.
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   What, then, of this "if"? We are not prepared to answer this
question. At least not yet.
   II. A Responsibility Without Limits  
   A. The Infinite and the Indefinite  
 Let us continue. Derrida posits a second possible relation
between deconstruction and justice - it is "the sense of a responsibility
without limits." 46 This responsibility is "necessarily excessive,
incalculable, before memory." 47 Deconstruction leads to justice
because it reveals the limitlessness of our responsibility.    
Nevertheless, a responsibility without limits is not the same
thing as justice. We do not necessarily increase justice by increasing
responsibility. Suppose a plaintiff is injured in a traffic accident. The
plaintiff picks a name at random from the phone directory and sues
this person as a defendant. We do not necessarily increase justice by
holding this person liable for the accident. Justice is increased by
eliminating her responsibility. 
Nor do we necessarily increase justice by increasing the
responsibility of all persons. Suppose that a defendant strikes a
plaintiff because the plaintiff is homosexual and the defendant hates
homosexuals. We can justly hold the defendant responsible for this
brutality. Suppose, however, that the defendant argues as follows: His
parents are also responsible because they abused him as a child. The
bystanders on the street are responsible because they did not intervene
on the plaintiff's behalf. The police are responsible because they did
not prevent the injury from occurring. The state's mental health
agencies are responsible because they did not offer the defendant free
counseling to deal with his aggression and his hatred of homosexuals,
and so on. 
The difficulty is that to increase the responsibility of one
person is often to decrease the responsibility of another. Here the
defendant attempts to decrease his responsibility by shifting it to third
     48 Increasing responsibility, moreover, always comes at a cost. The
more things for which people are held responsible, the less time and
money they have for their own pursuits. Responsibility to others
comes at the price of one's freedom of action as well as one's security.
An infinite protection of security for all will result in an infinite
responsibility for all, which will paradoxically abolish the liberty of
all, and with it the security of all. The demand for infinite
responsibility is like the paradoxical predicament of the pantheist who
finds she must remain motionless because she fears that any
movement on her part will inadvertently destroy a bug or a
microorganism. Whatever she does, she is responsible. Yet her failure
to act makes her doubly responsible.
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parties. There is no problem in increasing the responsibility of all
persons as long as we insist that the defendant also remains fully
responsible. Indeed, this may be a more adequate description of the
situation. The difficulty arises anew, however, when we determine the
appropriate remedy for an injustice. How are we to divide up the
responsibility when the plaintiff demands compensation? The more
persons who are held responsible, the less each will have to pay, all
other things being equal. We might try to avoid this dilemma by
allowing the plaintiff full recovery from each person held responsible,
but surely this solution creates its own form of injustice. 48   
The demand for an increase of justice is not necessarily the
demand for increased responsibility. It is rather the demand for an
appropriate apportionment of responsibility. That is what "just"
means - neither too much nor too little, but just the right amount of
responsibility for each person. The very notion of apportionment
implies the possibility that the responsibility of some persons will be
decreased, if not eliminated. Justice involves the recognition that
people are simply not responsible for some of the things for which
others would like to hold them responsible. Furthermore, the demand
for an appropriate apportionment of responsibility presupposes that
there is a notion of appropriateness - that not every assertion of
responsibility is as valid as any other. If the deconstructive argument
is to make sense, it must assume that one's responsibility goes as far
as it should, but no further, whether or not this can be known for
certain. 
In this light, Derrida's essays on Paul de Man offer a useful
counterweight to his more abstract formulation. In these essays,
     49 See Derrida, Biodegradables, supra note 8, at 821.
     50 Derrida, Paul de Man's War, supra note 8, at 640-51.
     51 Id. at 650-51.
     52 Id. at 621-32. In fact, Derrida asserts that, because de Man
specifically distances himself from so-called "vulgar" antisemitism,
one can even read his article as implicitly rebuking the more virulent
examples of antisemitism in the pages of Le Soir. Id. at 625-26.
     53 Derrida, Biodegradables, supra note 8, at 820.
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Derrida does not assert that either he, or de Man, have limitless
responsibility. Rather, he attempts to put de Man's responsibility in its
proper perspective. He attempts to offer a just apportionment of
responsibility, blame, and innocence regarding de Man, himself, and
his critics. 
First, Derrida argues, de Man is not responsible for all of the
many evils of Nazism or for the Holocaust. To compare him to
Mengele, as one writer did, is unjust. 49 Second, it is unjust to read de
Man's later writings as an admission of guilt or responsibility - or as
an attempt to deny responsibility - for what he did during World War
II. 50 Third, although de Man wrote a series of articles expressing the
ideology of the occupation forces and one article which is blatantly
antisemitic, it is unjust to judge his whole life based on that one
episode in his youth. 51 Fourth - and this is the most controversial
point in his argument - Derrida suggests that de Man's articles are not
as   damning as one might be led to expect when they are read in the
appropriate context. According to Derrida, the explicit antisemitism
of the worst article is equivocal, and it is hardly as bad as many other
articles in Le Soir. 52   
In the same way, Derrida responds to the critics who attacked
his discussion of de Man by arguing that his responsibility and that of
the institution they call "Deconstruction" is less than they imply or
contend. They are unjust to Derrida, a Jew who was a teenager during
the Second World War: "I ... who have nothing whatever to do with
everything that happened; I who, at the time, was rather on the side
of the victims." 53 They are unjust as well to the practitioners of
deconstruction, "which at the time was at year minus twenty-five of




These remarks suggest that Derrida cannot mean by "a
responsibility without limits" a limitless responsibility. Otherwise, he,
de Man, and indeed all of us are responsible without limits for the
Holocaust and many other horrible crimes, both past and present. But
this would not be just: The demand of justice is often the demand that
we are not responsible, even though we have been unjustly accused.
Instead, we must offer an alternative account of "a
responsibility without limits" that saves it from these difficulties. This
account inevitably leads us to the transcendental conception of
deconstruction. A limitless responsibility could be an infinite
responsibility, or it could be a responsibility whose full contours
cannot be defined in advance. This is the distinction between the
infinite and the indefinite. We can say, both in the case of the infinite
and the indefinite, that one cannot draw determinate and clear
boundaries, so that in both cases we are, in a sense, "without limits."
The meaning of "without limits," however, is different in each case.
The infinite cannot be bounded because it is infinite. The indefinite
has no clear boundaries because its scope is so heavily dependent on
context, and not all possible future contexts can be prescribed in
advance. The indefinite has boundaries, but we do not know precisely
where they are. The infinite has no boundaries, and we know this for
certain. 
Thus, the indefinite is unlimited, but not in the way that the
infinite is. It makes perfect sense to say that an individual's
responsibility is "without limits" because it is always indefinite - that
is, because   the full contours of this responsibility can never be
completely articulated - but it is nevertheless limited in another sense
because it is not infinite. Paul de Man's responsibility for his wartime
journalism is without limits because its scope cannot be fully
demarcated: His actions will have had effects on individuals that he
could not have foreseen. Moreover, his actions will continue to have
effects about which modern day judges of his responsibility do not
and cannot know. In this sense, Paul de Man indeed has a
     55 For a fuller discussion, see J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99
Yale L.J. 1669 (1990) (book review).
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responsibility without limits. But it is not an infinite responsibility.
He is not responsible for the Holocaust, or the Lockerbie plane
bombing, or the French Revolution. 
We can also apply the distinction between the infinite and the
indefinite to the meanings of texts. People often associate
deconstruction with the claim that the meaning of texts is
indeterminate. Yet there are two ways to claim that meaning is
indeterminate: One can say that a text's meaning is infinite - that is,
that it means everything - or one can say that its meaning is indefinite.
If the meaning of every text is infinite, then all texts mean the same
thing, because all texts have every meaning. But if one says that the
meaning of every text is indefinite, we mean that the contexts in
which the text will take its meaning cannot be specified in advance,
and therefore the text will always have an excess of meaning over that
which we expect (or intend) it to have when it is let loose upon the
world. The first view of texts is consistent with a nihilistic account of
deconstruction; the second is consistent with the type of
deconstruction I advocate.
 The choice between these two approaches also corresponds
to two different explanations of how one deconstructs a conceptual
opposition. The strategy of the nihilistic view is one of total
effacement - all conceptual distinctions are imaginary because the
meanings of each side of the opposition are infinite. Therefore both
sides mean the same thing. The strategy of transcendental
deconstruction is one of nested opposition. A nested opposition is an
opposition in which the two sides "contain" each other - that is, they
possess a ground of commonality as well as difference. 55 In this case,
the deconstruction argues that the two sides are alike in some contexts
and different in others; the logocentric mistake has been to assert
categorically that they were simply identical or simply different.
Because the two sides form a nested opposition, their similarity and
their difference rely on context, but because context cannot be fully
determined in advance, the scope of their similarity and difference is
indefinite. In this way the transcendental conception of deconstruction
preserves the possibility of   conceptual distinctions, while the
     56 Note that even when deconstructive arguments are employed to
efface a particular distinction, they do not necessarily efface the
distinction in all contexts. Thus they should be distinguished from a
strategy of total effacement. Take for example the distinction between
writing and speech discussed in Derrida, supra note 18. Derrida
argues that speech and writing are special cases of a more general
form of "writing." He claims that people often assume that speech is
closer to truth or true meaning than writing, but this assumption is not
necessarily justified. Both possess the same features of signification,
which are simply more obvious in the case of writing. Derrida's
argument uses deconstruction for purposes of rectification; it argues
that this new conception is a better - that is, truer - way of viewing
things than the received wisdom. It is not a strategy of total
effacement because his argument does not in fact efface the
distinction between writing and speech in all contexts; it does so only
with respect to the issue of semiotic function. Writing is still written,
and speech is still spoken; hence even after the deconstruction we
cannot say that writing and speech are identical in all contexts of
judgment. This is a deconstructive argument of rectification; it shows
not that speech and writing are identical, but that there is a nested
opposition between the two concepts. See Balkin, supra note 55, at
1689-93.
28
nihilistic version does not. 56   
The distinction between transcendental deconstruction and its
unworkable alternative rests upon the distinction between the
indefinite and the infinite. However, since one can deconstruct any
distinction, one should also be able to deconstruct the distinction
between the indefinite and the infinite. Even here, however, we need
to ask what conception of deconstruction we should use to critique
the theory - the transcendental or the nihilistic. If we use a nihilistic
conception, we would be effacing this distinction. We would say that
there is no difference between the indefinite and the infinite in any
circumstance or situation. So, for example, we would be saying that
everything with indefinite boundaries is infinite in extension. It would
follow that each day is infinite in length because the boundary
between day and night is indefinite. Thus, the use of nihilistic
deconstruction leads to an untenable position, just as it leads to the
destruction of many other useful distinctions. But this is a reason to
think that the nihilistic conception of deconstruction is seriously
flawed.
     57 Id. at 1676.
 
     58 I have argued that transcendental deconstruction is premised on
the assumption of transcendent values, and that this assumption
inevitably leads to a logic of indefinite rather than infinite meanings.
We might be tempted to identify transcendent values with the infinite
rather than the indefinite because people sometimes think of the
transcendent as that which surpasses all others. However, the question
of transcendent values really concerns the relationship between
general normative concepts like justice or beauty and their particular
instantiations in the real world. Our notion of justice is transcendent
because no particular example of justice in the world is perfectly just;
it is indefinite because it cannot be reduced to any determinate
formula. These are two ways of describing the same phenomenon.
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Instead, we might deconstruct the distinction between the
indefinite and the infinite using the technique of transcendental
deconstruction. To deconstruct a conceptual opposition is to show
that the conceptual opposition is a nested opposition - in other words,
that the two concepts bear relations of mutual dependence as well as
mutual differentiation. 57 For example, we might discover that they
have elements in common, which become salient in some contexts,
but that in other contexts we note very important differences between
them, so that they are not the same in all respects. In fact, we would
note that the meaning of each depends in part on our ability to
distinguish it from the other in some contexts.    
Thus, transcendental deconstruction, which relies on the indefi
niteness rather than the effacement of all conceptual boundaries,
would insist that although we can offer relatively clear examples of
bounded but indefinite concepts - for example, between day and night
- we cannot demarcate in advance every example of the indefinite
from every example of the infinite. Some of the things that we
currently think are indefinite may turn out, in a different context of
judgment, to be infinite and vice versa. We cannot know for sure
because this distinction, like all others, is context dependent.
Nevertheless, the very fact that this distinction is so heavily
dependent upon context means that we cannot say that the distinction
is meaningless, or that the terms collapse into each other. 58  
    Nevertheless, our idea of justice is not infinite; it does not lack
boundaries, even if these are not fully determined. For example, the
value of justice is not the same thing as the value of beauty. If general
normative concepts really had no limits, they would all be identical
because there would be no way to distinguish them from each other.
So, although our transcendent notion of justice is not specific enough
to match any determinate example of justice or any determinate
formula of justice, it is specific enough to be distinguished from other
normative concepts. That is why it is indefinite but not infinite.
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   B. Deconstruction and Reconstruction
We have seen that, if Derrida's arguments about responsibility
are to make sense, he must be committed to a transcendental
conception of deconstruction, whether or not he specifically
recognizes this fact. Moreover, the concept of an indefinite, rather
than an infinite, responsibility better corresponds to the very
important relationship of mutual differentiation and dependence that
must always exist between law and justice. Laws apportion the
comparative responsibility of parties. But laws can never perform this
apportionment perfectly. They can never determine and assign
completely the full responsibility of each and every person, living or
dead, in exactly the right amount. First, laws must limit their concern
to certain features of a situation and to certain effects that have
already happened (or that can be proved in a court of law to have
happened). Second, laws can extend their reach only to some parties,
but not to all who might, in some larger sense, be responsible - for
example, those who escape judgment because they are dead, out of
the relevant jurisdiction, or bankrupt. Third, laws must speak in
general terms that must be applied to many different   factual contexts
and therefore at best can fit each of these contexts like a mass-
produced suit fits a body - perhaps well enough in some
circumstances to be presentable, but certainly not perfect in all
respects. Because responsibility is so deeply tied to context - both the
contexts which have already emerged and those which in the fullness
of time will emerge - human law must always, even in its best
moments, be merely a heuristic, a catch-as-catch-can solution to the
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problem of responsibility rather than a fully adequate solution. Thus,
to speak of the indefiniteness of human responsibility, and to speak
of its failure to be fully measured, apportioned, and captured by
human laws and human conventions, are really two ways of saying
the same thing.
At the same time, our notion of justice can only be articulated
and enforced through human laws and conventions. We may have an
idea of justice that always escapes law and convention, but the only
tools we have to express and enforce our idea are human laws and
human conventions. In this sense our conception of the just relies for
its articulation and enforcement on the imperfect law from which it
must always be distinguished. 
In sum, law is never perfectly just, but justice needs law to be
articulated and enforced. This argument is exemplary of a
transcendental approach to deconstruction, the only approach that can
rescue deconstruction from the nihilistic abyss of infinite meaning. It
assumes that human values like justice transcend the positive norms
of human culture, even as they depend upon these norms for their
articulation and expression. Human values like justice are always
indeterminate; they must be constructed and articulated through
culture, law, and convention. Yet any articulation of human value
never fully exhausts the scope of human evaluation. We may offer a
theory of what is just, and this theory may assist our judgments of
what is just, but it does not ever fully displace our sense of justice.
We always retain the ability to understand that our conventions, laws,
and theories of justice fall short of our value of justice. Thus, our
indeterminate values continue to demand more from us than our
articulations of them can ever give; our urge to evaluate serves as a
perpetual reminder of the gap between our values and their
articulations in law or convention.
Equally important, my argument assumes that it makes sense
to speak of the more just and the less just in a given context, even
though our sense of justice is always indeterminate and indefinite. It
denies that every conceptual articulation of justice is as good as any
other, or that every solution to the problem of justice is as good as any
other. If I claim that a human law only imperfectly captures the
responsibility of individuals, I must assume that there is another
accounting of responsibility that would be more just, even if I cannot
describe a perfectly just solution. If I do not assume this, then my
argument has no critical import. If there is no more just solution, then
     59 For a fuller discussion of the relationship between
deconstruction and reconstruction, see Balkin, supra note 27, at
124-27.
     60 Derrida, supra note 4, at 955.
     61 Id.
     62 Id.
     63 Id.
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either the solution which I criticize is the best possible solution - in
which case I have no reason to criticize it - or this solution is as good
as any other solution I might offer as an alternative - in which case
there is no reason to choose between them. 
Thus, the transcendental conception of deconstruction is
premised on the possibility of an alternative reconstruction that is
superior to the given target of deconstruction. In this sense,
deconstruction always depends on reconstruction, even though this
reconstruction may be subject to further deconstructive critique. At
the same time, theoretical (re)construction always depends on the
tools of deconstruction. If we wish to construct a just account of
moral or legal responsibility, we must be able to choose between
competing alternatives and discard those that prove unsatisfactory.
However, to critique the various possibilities, and discover their
hidden incoherences, we need the critical tools of deconstruction. 59
A deconstructionist, Derrida included, can hardly avoid this
analysis. Does he accept it? In his later writings, he seems to move
toward it. Deconstruction, he argues, demands that we "constantly ...
maintain an interrogation of the origin, grounds and limits of our
conceptual ... apparatus surrounding justice." 60 This demand does not
"neutralize an interest in justice" but "on the contrary ...
hyperbolically raises the stakes of exacting justice." 61
Deconstruction requires a "sensitivity to a sort of essential
disproportion" between existing law or custom and justice. 62 The
deconstructive attitude "strives to denounce not only theoretical limits
but also concrete injustices, with the most palpable effects, in the
good conscience that dogmatically stops before any inherited
determination of justice." 63 Hence, Derrida connects the notion of
limitless responsibility with deconstruction's "engagement" by an
     64 Id.
     65 Id. at 965.
     66 Id. By a "regulative idea," Kant meant an idea that we must
postulate or employ as a heuristic, in order to assist our use of reason.
The self, the world, and God are examples of regulative ideas. See
Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason 549-60 (Norman K.
Smith trans., London, MacMillan 1929) (1781).
     67 Derrida, supra note 4, at 955. In discussing Derrida's arguments
concerning justice I shall follow his practice of speaking about the
"demand" of justice, or about what justice "demands," to describe
what is just or unjust. Nevertheless, I should note at the outset that
this familiar locution has the twin rhetorical effects of
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"infinite demand ... for justice." 64    
Yet the claim of an essential disproportion between law and
justice simply restates the point that there is an idea or value of justice
that   transcends any specific example of justice, whether embodied
in law, custom, or convention. Indeed, as Derrida later notes, "the
deconstruction of all presumption of a determinant certitude of a
present justice itself operates on the basis of an infinite "idea of
justice.' " 65 This is perhaps the closest Derrida comes to the
transcendental conception. He hesitates at this point because he does
not wish "to assimilate too quickly this "idea of justice' to a regulative
idea (in the Kantian sense), to a messianic promise or to other
horizons of the same type." 66 Nevertheless, Derrida's hesitation is
unnecessary, for the deconstructive approach I advocate is not based
on a fixed and determinate Idea of justice, but an indeterminate and
indefinite human value. This value is the very sort of "demand" that
Derrida identifies with justice: an insatiable urge that is never fully
realized in the products of human law, culture, and convention.   
   III. Speaking in the Language of the Other
 
Derrida's third formulation of the relation between
deconstruction and justice notes the etymological connections
between justice and answering. To be just is to have responsibility,
which is to respond to or to answer for something. Thus, Derrida
speaks of justice as an "infinite demand." 67 However, not any answer
anthropomorphizing justice and downplaying human subjectivity, as
I describe more fully below. See infra text accompanying notes
136-37.
     68 See Derrida, supra note 4, at 949.
     69 See id.
     70 See id.
     71 See James B. White, Justice as Translation 257-69 (1990).
     72 See Derrida, supra note 4, at 949. This idea is related to a theme
that Derrida borrows from Heidegger and Levinas - the Other,
because it is an Other, always remains ultimately unreachable and
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will do. Justice, Derrida insists, requires one to address oneself to the
Other in the language of the Other: It requires us to forswear our own
way of thinking, talking, and looking at things in order to understand
the Other in all of her singularity and uniqueness. 68 This requirement
is ultimately impossible to attain, and hence the infinite demand of
justice can never fully be satisfied.    
Because justice demands that we address ourselves in the
language of the Other, the law can never be fully just. The problem
for law, Derrida argues, is threefold. First, law must speak in general
terms, and therefore it must simplify and falsify the situation at hand.
69 Legal understanding never allows us to understand situations or the
 persons affected in all of their uniqueness. We must understand them
instead filtered through a set of legal categories, or classes of
situations, that lump them together with many other equally
heterogenous and unique circumstances. The enforcement of the law
according to these categories is a form of simplification and
falsification, and this simplification and falsification are sources of
injustice. 70   
Second, as James Boyd White has recently noted, the problem
of justice is inherently a problem of translation. 71 For judges or other
parties to speak in the language of another, they must translate the
Other's language into their own. But translations are always
imperfect. They never fully convey the sense of the original. Hence
the very necessity of translation renders it impossible fully to speak
in the language of the Other. 72   
unfathomable.
     73 See id.
     74 See id.; White, supra note 71, at 262-63.
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Third, the requirement that law be impartial demands that we
not speak in the language of a particular party, but in a language that
is neutral and fair. 73 To speak in the language of only one of the
parties risks the danger of undue partiality toward that person, for the
situation will be completely described in terms of her experience and
her concerns. This result is unfair because it may give short shrift to
the experience and concerns of other parties. Hence, law, which
requires fairness to all parties, must proceed in the language of neither
one party nor the other, but in a third language that attempts - even if
it does not always succeed - to be fair to both sides. Legal justice
strives for an impartiality that is also impersonal. Yet this solution
creates its own set of problems, for the neutral language of a third
party fails to speak in the language of either party, and hence it
doubly falsifies the situation by denying or obscuring the uniqueness
and singularity of each side. 74   
Derrida's ethics of Otherness contains two separate
imperatives. The first demands that we see a situation in all of its
singularity. The second demands that we attempt to see things from
the Other's point of view, using her vocabulary and her way of
understanding the world. To deal justly with each of these two points,
we must not conflate them, but rather deal with each separately - that
is, respecting the singularity and difference of each.  
   A. Justice as the Recognition of Singularity
  
Derrida's demand that we see each situation in all its
singularity is ambiguous. We could interpret it either as a claim of
absolute difference among situations or only as one of relative
difference. A claim of absolute difference means that we must see
each situation as completely different from every other. A claim of
relative difference means that we must see each situation as different
from any other in some respects but not in others. Each situation is
both different from and similar to every other situation; its uniqueness
consists in the fact that this combination of similarity and difference
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manifests itself in different ways for each situation to which it is
compared. Thus, A and B are both similar to and different from C;
but A and B are unique because they are similar to and different from
C in different ways. 
We may state this distinction in another way. Consider three
situations A, B, and C. They are all different. But are two of them
more alike than the third? There are two positions we can take. One
argues that all of them are absolutely different; consequently, no
situation is any more like another than any other situation. The
alternative position would insist that we cannot answer this question
until we know what context the questioner has in mind. Given a
particular context of decision, it will often be possible to say that two
situations are more like each other than either is to a third; but this
judgment may shift radically if the context of judgment is sufficiently
altered. If we are concerned only with the question of weight, an
elephant and a truck are more alike than either is to an amoeba. Yet
if the context of judgment is shifted to the question of animate versus
inanimate, the elephant and the amoeba are more alike than either is
to the truck. This alternative position asserts the relative similarity
and difference of all situations. 
Does Derrida mean to suggest a theory of absolute difference
or a theory of relative difference? If justice is an "infinite demand,"
perhaps we must keep trying to view a situation as different from any
other in every respect. That would presume a theory of infinite
difference. Yet, if Derrida means that justice requires us to assert the
absolute difference of every situation, his claim is incoherent. It will
be impossible to decide any case, because no case can be compared
to any other. Because each case is completely different from all
others, no case is a better point of comparison than any other. We
cannot apply any consistent principle to different cases; hence, our
judgment is merely one of fiat, for no decision is any more principled
or unprincipled than any other. Conversely, we might also say that all
decisions are equally principled.  Because there are no relative
degrees of comparison, any judgment is as good an exemplar of our
principles as any other. 
If Derrida's claim is based on a notion of relative difference,
however, it accurately describes the predicament of just
     75 This interpretation seems most consistent with his criticisms of
Levinas. See, e.g., Drucilla Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit
53-55, 68-72, 83-85 (1992); Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference
126-28 (Alan Bass trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1978) (1967);
Guyora Binder, Representing Nazism: Advocacy and Identity at the
Trial of Klaus Barbie, 98 Yale L.J. 1321, 1376 (1989).
     76 Christopher Sullivan, Small Town Ponders Prison for Snickers
Theft, Austin Am. Statesman, Sept. 19, 1993, at A10.
     77 Id.
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decisionmaking. 75 Each case is both similar to and different from
every other, depending on how we look at it. The difficulty of just
decisionmaking lies precisely in deciding what is the appropriate
context of judgment. The question of principled consistency is the
question of which cases our case is most like and which cases it is
least like, given the appropriate context of judgment.    
Consider the recent example of a seventeen-year-old high
school student who was sentenced by a judge in Thomaston, Georgia
to three years in prison for stealing an ice cream bar from the school
cafeteria. 76 The judge defended his decision on the grounds that the
case was a burglary, and the penalty for burglary was three years. He
argued that the appropriate context of judgment involved the
definition of burglary, the legislature's decision to fix the age of
majority at seventeen, and his county's practice of uniform
punishments for all violators of the same crime. His judgment was
criticized on two grounds, each of which offered a competing context
of judgment. First, what the student did was more like a schoolboy
prank than a professional breaking and entering. Second, on the same
day the student was sentenced to three years, the judge gave
suspended sentences and fines to several people convicted of drug
possession and drunk driving. 77   
We can only criticize the judge's decision if we assume the
relative difference of situations - that is, only if we argue that this
situation is both different from and similar to others. In order to
differentiate this case from an "ordinary" case of burglary, we must
be able to say that this defendant was a student like other students,
that his action was a prank like other schoolyard pranks. In order to
argue that it is unfair that drug users and drunk drivers should receive
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a lesser penalty, we must be able to assess comparative degrees of
responsibility and harm between situations. Yet this means that we
must already be able to see these situations as similar in some
respects; this similarity is necessary for them to be comparable or
commensurable according to some common metric. We cannot
compare these situations if we assume that each is unique in the sense
of absolutely different. We can only make such a judgment if we see
each situation as relatively different. Thus, justice may require that we
understand each situation in its uniqueness, but, ironically, this
requires that we treat it like the situations that are most similar to it
in the appropriate context of judgment. To recognize its uniqueness,
we must also recognize its similarity to other situations. 
The same criterion of relative difference applies when we seek
a just understanding of persons who are different from us. It is
important to try to understand and respect people who are different
from us. To understand and respect their difference, however, we
must first understand their similarity to us. We must try to see how
their concerns and values are really similar to our concerns and our
values, and thus, how the situation they find themselves in and their
reactions to that situation make sense. At the same time, to grasp this
similarity, to put ourselves in other people's shoes, we must recognize
how our lives and theirs are different. That is why every attempt at
understanding is a simultaneous assertion of commonality with and
difference from the Other. If we unthinkingly assume that the Other
is too much like us, we will never understand her actions when they
diverge from our own; if we insist on our absolute difference from
her, she will never be able to understand us. 
The competing interpretations of absolute and relative
difference offer two different accounts of the predicament of judging.
The theory of absolute difference suggests that just judging is
impossible because no situation is really like any other. All principled
decisionmaking is completely indeterminate because we have no way
of comparing situations when each is absolutely different. On the
other hand, the theory of relative difference argues that doing justice
is difficult because there are so many ways to see situations as similar
as well as different. The problem is not that no two situations are ever
similar; it is that there are too many ways in which situations are
similar to each other, and we must try to parse out the right ways to
assess this similarity. In other words, the secret of judging lies in
determining the appropriate context of judgment. However, we can
     78 See Derrida, supra note 4, at 949.
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never fully determine the present context, and we can never fully
know of the presence or absence of other events that might
significantly alter the context of our judgment when we decide a case.
Therefore we are always uncertain - at least to some degree - about
the justice of our decision.
 Note that the dependence of justice on context is much like
the dependence of meaning on context. The indeterminacy of
meaning and the uncertainty of judgment are both based on the
indefiniteness of context. This view is consistent with the
transcendental approach to deconstruction. In contrast, an approach
that asserts the infinite difference of each situation is just the flip side
of an approach that asserts that meaning is infinite. The former asserts
the absolute difference of all situations and all people, while the latter
asserts the absolute identity of all meanings. Both approaches lead to
normative nihilism and a failure of understanding. As before,
Derrida's arguments only make sense if his is a transcendental
account of deconstruction.
   B. Justice as Understanding the Other's Point of View
 
Derrida's ethics of Otherness has a second component: It
employs a different sense of individuality and uniqueness. Under this
view, justice requires one to speak in the language of the Other by
trying to see things from the Other's point of view. 78 This conception
of justice seems most attractive when we are the injurer or the
stronger party in a relationship, or when we are in the position of a
judge who is attempting to arbitrate between competing claims. For
example, suppose that we are the State, the stronger party, the
oppressor, or the injurer, or suppose that we are contemplating an
action that might put us in such a position. It seems only just that we
should try to understand how we have injured or oppressed the Other
(or might be in a position to injure or oppress). We can only do this
if we try to see the problem from the Other's perspective and
understand her pain and her predicament in all of its uniqueness. The
duty we owe to the Other is the duty to see how our actions may
affect or have affected the Other; to fulfill this duty we must put away
our own preconceptions and vocabulary and try to see things from her
     79 Derrida, Paul de Man's War, supra note 8, at 644.
     80 Derrida, Biodegradables, supra note 8, at 823. Derrida combines
the "p" in pouvoir (can) and the "v" in vouloir (want) to create the
expression "je ne pveux pas lire (I can/will not read)." Id. at 828; see
also id. at 827, 843.
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point of view. Similarly, if we are a judge in a case attempting to
arbitrate between the parties, the ethics of Otherness demands that we
try to understand how our decision will affect the two parties, and this
will require us to see the matter from their perspective.
 Suppose, however, that we are not the injurer, but the victim;
not the State, but the individual; not the strong, but the weak; not the
oppressor, but the oppressed. Does justice require that we speak in the
language of the person we believe is injuring or oppressing us? Must
a rape victim attempt to understand her violation from the rapist's
point of view? Does justice demand that she attempt to speak to the
rapist in his own language - one which has treated her as less than
human?  Must a concentration camp survivor address her former
captor in the language of his worldview of Aryan supremacy? We
might wonder whether this is what justice really requires, especially
if the injustice we complain of is precisely that the Other failed to
recognize us as a person, refused to speak in our language, and
declined to consider our uniqueness and authenticity. 
When we move from Derrida's grand pronouncements on the
ethics of the Other to the place "where he lives," to his writings on
Paul de Man, we see this pleasant formula properly deconstructed.
Derrida both adopts and rejects the formula in different contexts. For
example, Derrida applies the formula when he demands that his
critics read both him and de Man fairly. His first rule of just
interpretation is "respect for the other, that is, for his right to
difference, in his relation to others but also in his relation to himself."
79 To judge de Man fairly, one must speak to de Man in his own
language and read him in the proper context.    
Thus, Derrida insists that we evaluate de Man through the
ethics of the Other. But what is the proper attitude to take toward de
Man's critics? Derrida argues that he faces a serious problem: These
critics cannot or will not read what he and de Man say; he describes
them through the neologism ne pveulent pas lire - they can't/won't
read. 80 These critics have failed the call of justice; they have not been
     81 Indeed, so egregious is their practice of reading that at one point
Derrida wonders whether they can even be considered to be morally
responsible for their actions. Id. at 823. Because the category of ne
pveut pas lire "displaces the category of responsibility," Derrida
insists that he is not passing judgment on his critics: "Moreover, I
bear these five no ill will; I have nothing against them; I would even
like (if only in order to avoid this spectacle) to help them free
themselves from this frightened, painful, and truly excessive hatred."
Id. However, given the tone of the rest of the article, one might be
pardoned if one were tempted to take these protestations of good will
at less than face value.
     82 Id. at 872.
     83 Indeed, Derrida insists, one does not even have to respond at all
to accusations that are fundamentally unfair or disrespectful:
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open to the Other - de Man and Derrida. 81 What does justice demand
of Derrida in defense of de Man? Here Derrida's practice deconstructs
his theory: The essay Biodegradables cannot be described as anything
other than a polemic. Derrida is perfectly aware of this but considers
it unavoidable:
I have never in my life taken the initiative of a
polemic. Three or four times, and always in response, and
always because I was invited to do so, I have simply tried to
confront some manipulations that were too serious to
ignore....   
Of those who might regret the harshness or the high-
handedness of certain of my remarks, right here, I ask - isn't
it only fair?  - to reread  one more time the critical responses.
Then they will have a better measure of the aggression - its
violence and its mediocrity - that has me as its victim .... It is
not possible for me to respond on that level. And it is my duty
not to accept it. One does not always decide by oneself on a
high-handed tone. 82
 
Justice, it seems, does not always demand that one speak in
the language of the Other, especially when the Other is not playing by
the same rules. 83 Jesus might have advised his followers to turn the
Is it necessary to respond to every interpellation, to
everyone no matter who, to every question, and especially to
every public attack? The answer is "yes," it seems, when time
and energy permit, to the extent to which the response keeps
open, in spite of everything, a space of discussion. Without
such a space no democracy and no community deserving of
the name would survive. But the answer is "no" if the said
interpellations fail to respect certain elementary rules, if they
so lack decency or interest that the response risks shoring
them up with a guarantee, confirming in some way a
perversion of the said democratic discussion. Yet, in that case,
it would be necessary that the nonresponse be appropriately
interpreted as a sign of respect for certain principles and not





other cheek and to love their enemies, but this approach is not
necessarily what justice requires or a particularly good strategy for
achieving a just result. Not all encounters with an Other will involve
willing participants in an open dialogue. Nevertheless, justice
demands that the oppressor answer for her wrong, whether or not she
admits her fault. Even if she makes no answer to her victim, she must
answer for her crime. Justice demands satisfaction, even (and
especially) if the miscreant is unwilling to provide satisfaction. The
answer that an oppressive Other must provide to an oppressed Other -
for example, a prison sentence or a money judgment - is not
necessarily addressed to the victim in her language. It is not
necessarily even understood by the injurer as an answer to the victim,
or as an attempt to understand the victim in all of her singularity.
Sometimes justice makes its demand precisely when people will not
understand each other, when they will not treat others as equals.    
Thus, perhaps unsurprisingly, justice demands that we deal
with people and things not in a self-abnegating manner, but in the
manner appropriate to the situation before us. Centuries ago,
Confucius argued that the virtuous man is one who knows both how
to love people to the extent they are deserving of love, and to hate
     84 Confucius, The Analects 4:3 (D.C. Lau trans., Chinese Univ.
Press 1983) (1979).
     85 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method 261-62 (Garrett
Barden & John Cumming eds. & Sheed & Ward Ltd. trans., Seabury
Press 1975) (1960).
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people to the extent that they are deserving of hate. 84 Justice demands
that we speak in the language of the Other to the extent that it is
appropriate to do so because this would further justice, but it equally
demands that we not do so when it would increase injustice.
We may connect this point to our earlier criticism of the
notion of a "responsibility without limits." Derrida has argued that the
ethics of Otherness imposes upon us a responsibility to speak in the
language of the Other. However, because justice is a responsibility
without limits, we might ask as before whether this responsibility to
the Other is an infinite responsibility or merely an indefinite one. 
Thus, there are two different interpretations of the ethics of
Otherness. The first imposes an infinite duty; the second imposes
only an indefinite duty. The first corresponds to a nihilistic
conception of deconstruction; the second to the transcendental
conception. The requirement of an infinite duty means that we must
in every case use all the available means at our disposal to speak in
the language of the Other; the requirement of an indefinite duty
means we must make some attempt to speak in the language of the
Other, and that the boundaries of our duty are uncertain and
contextually driven. In the first case, the demand of justice is never
satisfied because this demand is infinite; in the second case, we can
never be certain that the demand of justice is satisfied because the
duty it imposes is indefinite. 
All of the difficulties with the ethics of Otherness arise from
the assumption that our responsibility to speak in the language of the
Other is infinite. We can restate the difficulty by relating it to a
similar problem in understanding the views of another. This is the
problem of hermeneutic charity. When we try to understand what
another person means, we usually do so by trying to envision how
what they are saying makes sense. As Hans-Georg Gadamer has
argued, we must make an "anticipation of completion" that what
another is saying is coherent and has a claim to truth. 85 A stance of
openness and interpretive charity is actually essential to the process
     86 See id. at 263.
     87 Cf. id. at 262.
     88 See id. at 262.
     89 Id. at 270.
     90 See Balkin, supra note 27, at 163.
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of understanding. If we do not take this stance, we cannot be sure that
our discovery of incoherence or falsity in another's position is due to
a defect in their argument or our inability to understand it fully. 86   
In other words, when attempting to understand another person,
especially a person with a different world view from our own, we
must be open to the possibility that the truth is more on their side than
ours, that what they are saying is really true and valid - indeed, more
true and valid than our own beliefs. Thus, we must be open to the
possibility that our encounter with the Other will change our own
views about what is true and good. 87 Understanding, then, is a kind
of vulnerability or openness to the truth that the Other may have to
express. 88 It always requires the possibility that our beliefs will be
changed through our encounter with the Other. Indeed, Gadamer
argues, if we do not come to our encounter with this hermeneutic
openness, we can never achieve real understanding; at most we
achieve a halfway measure, in which we withhold ourselves from true
understanding because we withhold ourselves from the necessary
hermeneutic vulnerability. 89  
The duty of hermeneutic charity in Gadamer's theory of
interpretation strongly resembles Derrida's version of the ethics of
Otherness. Given the common influence of Heidegger on both
thinkers, this commonality should not be surprising. Yet Gadamer's
duty of interpretive charity and openness to the object of
interpretation raises a serious difficulty. If this duty is endless, it is
hard to distinguish this duty from a duty to reach an agreement with
the person we are trying to understand. We do not know, in other
words, at what point we should cease our efforts to see the truth in the
views of the other party and simply recognize that they are wrong or
that their argument is incoherent. If we go too far, we risk the danger
of what I call hermeneutic cooptation. 90 By repeatedly blaming the
     91 Id. at 160-61, 167-69.




incoherence or wrongness of the argument of another solely on our
insufficient failure to understand it, we place all the responsibility for
intellectual change upon ourselves. There is the danger that our drive
to understand the truth in the other person's views will lead us to be
coopted by those views and brought into agreement with things we
should not agree with, because they are false, misleading, or unjust.91
 There is a further difficulty. If the Other's views treat us as
objects or as persons who deserve no respect, the requirement of
continual hermeneutic charity will require us to adopt ways of
thinking and talking that are unjust to ourselves. That is why we
hesitate to think that justice requires that a political prisoner strive to
speak in the language of her former torturers, or that a Holocaust
survivor attempt to understand her own situation in the language of
Aryan supremacy. To require this sort of understanding is to require
these people to injure themselves psychically through the duty of
understanding. For want of a better name, let us call this the
requirement of hermeneutic masochism. True justice toward another
should never involve hermeneutic cooptation, and it should never
require hermeneutic masochism. 
An infinite responsibility to speak in the language of the Other
creates the perpetual danger of hermeneutic cooptation and
hermeneutic masochism. It leads to the ridiculous spectacle of the
rape victim being asked to understand that, in the eyes of her attacker,
she was really just an object for subordination and conquest. It leads
to the conclusion that blacks should be more understanding when
white police officers automatically assume that they are likely to be
criminals. 92 An infinite responsibility to speak in the language of the
Other can easily lead to perpetual justification of the Other, no matter
how unreasonable their position. This is not what justice requires.  
The postulation of an infinite duty is untenable. Yet we might
still make sense of the ethics of Otherness by viewing the duty to
understand as indefinite rather than infinite. We have some duty to
     93 See Cornell, supra note 75, at 54; Derrida, supra note 75, at 128.
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speak in the language of the Other, but our duty is not infinite.
Instead, justice demands that we make just the right amount of effort
to understand the Other. Beyond that point, it is not only appropriate
but necessary for us to recognize that the Other's views are incoherent
or unjustified, and that our own position is more reasonable. We have
a duty to be open to and absorb that part of the Other's point of view
which furthers justice while disagreeing with the rest. 
But if we have this responsibility, how will we know when to
cease our efforts at understanding? How will we know when we have
done all that justice requires? We cannot know the full contours of
our responsibility in advance of our encounter with the Other. Each
situation will be different, and our responsibility in each situation will
depend heavily on the context of the encounter. Hence our
responsibility to the Other, while not infinite, is nevertheless
indefinite. 
There is a further reason why our duty to the Other must be
indefinite. It has to do with the symmetrical nature of Otherness. 93
We are always an Other to the person who is an Other to us. The
ethics of Otherness seems most appealing when we sympathize with
the Other because the Other is the oppressed, the victim, or a
potential object of injustice. However, we cannot state as a general
rule that only the oppressor needs to speak in the language of the
oppressed, or the injurer in the language of the victim. An additional
problem of indefiniteness arises because these categories are not
always clearly defined. In different contexts, and from different
perspectives, different people appear to be strong or weak, injurer or
victim, oppressor or oppressed, judge or judged.    
First, the roles of the two parties may shift radically depending
on how one describes the situation. Consider two neighbors who
make conflicting uses of their property. Suppose that Neighbor One
needs to operate machinery to run her business while Neighbor Two
needs peace and quiet for her health. The second neighbor regards the
first neighbor as an injurer; Neighbor One should try to understand
how important it is for Neighbor Two to have peace and quiet. But
Neighbor One has a symmetrical complaint. If she has to stop
operating her machine, she will go out of business. Neighbor Two's
demand is unreasonable under the circumstances, and justice requires
     94 This example draws on the familiar Coasean point that both
parties are causal factors in their conflicting use. R.H. Coase, The
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1, 2 (1960).
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that Neighbor Two understand the significant costs her request will
impose on Neighbor One. 94 In this situation each party is an Other to
the other, and each is an Other to the judge who must decide the case.
Thus there are at least four different potential duties to respond. Both
neighbors must make some effort to understand the position of the
Other, but the roles of oppressor and oppressed, victim and injurer,
are not determined in advance. Similarly, the judge must attempt to
understand the situation of each neighbor from each neighbor's
perspective, but the extent of this duty depends on which neighbor is
acting unjustly toward the other, and this is the very question that the
judge must decide.   
Thus, the scope of the duty owed to speak in the language of
the Other depends on our definition of the roles of the parties - as
victim or injurer, strong or weak - but this definition will in turn be
affected by the scope of the duty to speak in the language of the
Other. For example, the more we try to see things from Neighbor
One's perspective, the clearer it may become that Neighbor Two is
being unreasonable, oppressive, and playing the role of the potential
injurer. Yet the opposite conclusion might follow if we attempt to see
the situation from Neighbor Two's perspective. The scope of our duty
to speak in the language of the Other does not exist before we decide
what their respective roles are, but the roles each plays cannot fully
be determined before we fix the scope of the duty; each feature of the
situation provides the proper context in which the other feature is to
be judged. Because of the mutual dependence and differentiation of
these contexts, the scope of the duty toward the Other is indefinite. It
is neither infinite nor nonexistent, but dependent on facts and
circumstances that are never fully clear, and whose precise contours
we cannot fully determine in advance. Thus, the duty to speak in the
language of the Other becomes a duty without limits, but it is by no
means an infinite duty as Derrida suggests.
The difficulty that produces indefiniteness may be subdivided
into two problems: Let us call them the problem of certainty and the
problem of proportion or degree. The problem of certainty arises
when we cannot be sure whether a person is in fact an oppressor or an
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oppressed person. Justice may require us to decide this question,
rather than use it as a basis for determining just action. Suppose a
criminal defendant is accused of rape. If he really raped the victim, he
is an oppressor. Justice demands that he recognize how he has
harmed his victim and answer for his crime. If he is innocent,
however, he will be oppressed if the State fails to do justice to him.
The State must therefore ensure that it hears his story and understands
the situation from his point of view; it must make sure that it does not
convict him based on false evidence or unreasoning stereotypes. At
the same time, it must not unthinkingly accept every piece of
exculpatory evidence and every exculpatory account the defendant
might offer, for that might create an equal and opposite injustice. In
a criminal case we cannot determine in advance whether a person is
guilty or innocent; that is precisely the purpose of a criminal trial.
Given this situation, does justice demand that we speak to the
defendant in his language or that he speak to us in our own? Our
uncertainty in this regard leads to the indefiniteness of the duty. 
The problem of degree arises because a person may at one and
the same time be an injurer or oppressor to some degree and a victim
or an oppressed person to another degree. Suppose that we are quite
sure that a criminal defendant is guilty of rape. He nevertheless
deserves to be treated with some respect; for example, the State
should not be permitted to torture him to extract a confession, and it
must give him an opportunity to defend himself in court. His crime
may be less bad than other crimes of the same sort; if so, justice
requires that he be given a chance to produce exculpatory evidence,
and the State has a duty to consider it and lessen his sentence to the
appropriate extent. If the State fails to protect the defendant's rights,
he may be in the position of an oppressed party, despite his horrible
crime. Thus, the State has a duty to speak in his language with respect
to some features of the situation, but not with respect to others. These
complications also produce an indefinite duty.
The case of Paul de Man is a perfect example of the
indefiniteness of our duty toward the Other. The entire debate
surrounding de Man concerns what role he should be assigned. Is de
Man a victim of unjust accusation or a person who unjustly accused
others (Jews)? Was he a collaborator, an ambitious man without a
moral compass who sought to forget his sordid past, or was he an
immature youth who  made an early mistake yet matured into a
respected scholar? The question of his status is inextricable from the
     95 We should not confuse the question whether our responsibility
to the Other is infinite or indefinite with still another reason why the
demand of justice may remain unsatisfied in a particular case: the
impossibility of a commensurable remedy. Often subsequent
reparations for an injury never seem adequate to compensate for a
previous loss. But this impossibility is not because either the loss or
the responsibility for the loss is infinite, in the sense of having a
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question of what it means to be fair to him. Moreover, even if de Man
willingly wrote antisemitic literature, justice requires that he be
condemned only to the extent that he is responsible, but not to the
extent that he is not responsible. In order to be fair to de Man, we
must try to understand what he did and wrote, and this endeavor may
require us to understand how he understood his actions and his
writings. Nevertheless, we do not have to accept everything he said
or did at face value or interpret every one of his writings or actions so
as to exculpate him, just as we should not deliberately interpret his
life in its worst possible light. Our duty of fairness is indefinite, but
not infinite in either direction - toward exculpation or inculpation. We
can be unjust either by refusing to speak in the language of the Other
or by exclusively adopting that tongue. 
Note that we cannot avoid these difficulties by insisting that
all parties, whether victim or injurer, oppressor or oppressed, have an
equal and infinite duty to speak in the language of the Other. An
equal and infinite duty on all sides leads to either incoherence or
injustice. It means that the rapist and the rape victim have equal
duties to understand each other in terms of each other's conception of
each other, and this requirement permits neither a determinable
decision nor a just one. Justice demands that each "speak in the
language of the Other" to the proper amount, to the proper degree,
and in the proper circumstances. This duty is without limits not
because it is infinite but because it is indefinite - because the question
of duty to the Other is bound up with the very description of the
situation which the duty concerns. 
An indefinite duty, like an indefinite responsibility, is
"without limits" because its contours are context bound and because
this context cannot be fully determined in advance. What would an
indefinite duty toward the Other mean? It would be a duty that can
never fully be satisfied. However, it cannot be satisfied because we
are uncertain about its scope, not because the demand is infinite. 95 
limitless magnitude. Rather, the problem is one of
incommensurability between the loss and any remedy we could offer.
This incommensurability arises from the fact that our lives change in
response to the events that happen to us. Our situation after an injury
cannot be made fully commensurable with the situation before
because both we and the world around us have changed as a result
and can never be the same again. The past, precisely because it is
past, can never fully be redeemed. The nature and direction of our
lives have been irrevocably altered by previous actions and events; we
become different people because of what has happened to us.
Thus, if the defendant accidentally breaks the plaintiff's leg,
she may be deeply sorry for what she has done. Yet her action has
affected the lives of others in a way that cannot fully be repaired, no
matter what good deeds she later performs, and no matter how much
assistance she offers to the victim and the victim's family. In such
circumstances, the reason why the injurer's responsibility can never
be fully satisfied is not because it is infinite in magnitude. The
problem is that any remedy we could offer will be of the wrong kind,
because we cannot relive the past. Thus, the fact that we live our lives
in unidirectional time by itself can make subsequent remedies for
finite harms incommensurable and hence essentially and perpetually
inadequate.
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Previously we identified the concept of an infinite
responsibility with normative nihilism. The notion of an infinite duty
to speak in the language of the Other - which is a total abandonment
of ourselves to the language of the Other - also leads to a kind of
nihilism. Hoping to efface the distinction between self and Other, we
succeed only in effacing the self and its language, just as the
effacement of all distinctions leads to the destruction of meaning.
This endeavor leads to a "nihilism of the self." The preservation of
the self is the preservation of its Otherness from the Other, which is
also the preservation of its partial similarity to the Other, and a source
of the indefiniteness of its duty toward the Other. When we
understand deconstruction to require an indefinite obligation, we
preserve the self and make sense of the demand of justice; but when
we understand deconstruction to require an infinite demand, it must
lead to effacement or nihilism.
   IV. Deconstruction as an "Antitotalitarian" Form of Analysis
     96 Derrida, Paul de Man's War, supra note 8, at 648.
     97 Id. at 645.
     98 Id. at 647.
     99 Id. at 646.
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Derrida's final suggestion connects deconstruction to an
opposition to totalitarianism in thought. Derrida insists that what he
has always practiced under the name of deconstruction "has always
seemed to me favorable, indeed destined (it is no doubt my principal
motivation) to the analysis of ... totalitarianism in all its forms, which
cannot always be reduced to names of regimes." 96 He finds examples
of totalitarian thinking in criticisms of Paul de Man; since these
critics are so concerned with denouncing political totalitarianism, he
argues, they should avoid reproducing the logic of totalitarianism in
their judgments and readings. 97 In fact, deconstructive analysis,
which they attack, is the best way to avoid totalitarian logic:
"Deconstructions have always represented ... the at least necessary
condition for identifying and combating the totalitarian risk" in
discourse. 98  
What is a "totalitarian" logic of discourse or a "totalitarian"
gesture in discourse? Derrida seems to identify it with various forms
of oversimplification, falsification, or rushing to judgment. His
examples describe features that he finds objectionable in various
critical readings of de Man's work: 
 
purification, purge, totalization, reappropriation,
homogenization, rapid objectification, good conscience,
stereotyping and nonreading, immediate politicization or
depoliticization (the two always go together), immediate
historicization or dehistoricization (it is always the same
thing), immediate ideologizing moralization (immorality
itself) of all the texts and all the problems, expedited trial,
condemnations, or acquittals, summary executions or
sublimations. This is what must be deconstructed. 99 
All of these sins of reading and understanding share an
inattention - whether willful or innocent - to problems of context.
     100 Id. at 645.
     101 For example, Derrida himself thinks it important to condemn
Nazism and political totalitarianism in all of their forms. See id.
     102 Id.
     103 Id.
     104 Id.
     105 Id.
52
They oversimplify by failing to spend the time or effort to see the
multifaceted and complicated textures of meaning that attend any text
or any event. 100 The totalitarian gesture, then, is oversimplification
and inattention to complexity and context; the antitotalitarian gesture,
which is just, is a corresponding attention to these features of texts.
Of  course, a judgment whether one is being insufficiently
sensitive to context is itself a contextual judgment. For example, in
some contexts, dismissing another's arguments, making categorical
distinctions, and even rushing to judgment may not be an entirely bad
practice. 101 Derrida denies that "we have access to a complete
formalization of this totalitarian logic" or can be absolutely exterior
to it. 102 There is no "systematic set of themes, concepts,
philosophemes, forms of utterance, axioms, evaluations, hierarchies
which, forming a closed and identifiable coherence of what we call
totalitarianism, fascism, nazism, racism, antisemitism, never appear
outside these formations and especially never on the opposite side."
103 Indeed, there is no "systematic coherence proper to each of them,
since one must not confuse them too quickly with each other." 104
Conversely, there is no discursive act which is completely
antitotalitarian, for there is no "property so closed and so pure that
one may not find any element of these systems in discourses that are
commonly opposed to them." 105
 Derrida's identification of deconstructive argument with
antitotalitarianism is really a special case of his critique of
logocentrism. The problem of logocentrism is the problem of
categorical judgment. Categorical judgments are judgments that
employ categories; whenever we predicate a property of an object, we
place it in a category. We say that it is this way rather than that, that
     106 Although this sort of argument is generally associated with
conceptual relativism, we should note that it is perfectly consistent
with a realist ontology. One might believe that linguistic categories
lump together objects that are really similar in some respects,
although different in others, and that the grounds of this similarity and
difference are not simply a matter of human convention.
     107 Thus, Derrida insists, "one must analyze as far as possible this
process of formalization and its program so as to uncover the
statements, the philosophical, ideological, or political behaviors that
derive from it and wherever they may be found." Derrida, Paul de
Man's War, supra note 8, at 646.
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it goes into this box rather than another. In fact, categorical judgments
are necessary to our thought; they are the basis of all judgments of
similarity and difference. Of course the term categorical has another
meaning as well - insensitivity to context. Categorical obligations are
unconditional; to state something categorically is to assert it without
regard to (at least some types of) context. Thus, categorical
judgments, because they are categorical, are to some degree
acontextual. They must lump some things together as similar and
exclude others as different, without attending to the similarities
across, or the differences within, the boundaries that they establish.
Hence every categorical judgment is a sort of falsification or
oversimplification of the situation. Of course that is precisely why
categories are useful. In a world of infinite diversity, change, and
differentiation, categories gather things together and treat them as
similar so that the human mind can understand the world before it.
One might think of categories, then, as heuristics that aid
understanding through partial simplification. 106  
What is most remarkable about categorical judgment, then, is
that it is simultaneously useful, adequate, and empowering in some
contexts and deficient, inadequate, and misleading in others. We
cannot do without categorical judgments of some type, yet if we do
not pay sufficient attention to the context in which we make them,
they may lead us away from what is true and what is just.
Deconstruction helps us to recognize the discrepancy between the
categorical judgments we make and the context our judgment
overlooks. A perfectly just treatment of a situation would require us
to understand the situation in all of its contextual richness. 107
     108 Id.
     109 Id. at 648.
     110 See id. at 645 ("Such a formalizing, saturating totalization
seems to me to be precisely the essential character of this logic whose
project, at least, and whose ethico-political consequence can be
terrifying.").
54
Nevertheless, we must make categorical judgments of some type to
articulate the very context we seek to uncover. Context itself must be
describable in terms that are unavoidably categorical. Hence the
process of deconstructive analysis, while "urgent," is also
"interminable." 108 Deconstruction becomes "the tireless analysis
(both theoretical and practical) of ... adherences" 109 to the totalitarian
discourses that remain lodged even in one's own ways of thinking and
which one is trying to combat.   
 Indeed, in articulating his point, Derrida falls prey to the very
danger he warns against. Derrida labels all the various forms of
oversimplification and acontextual judgment as "totalitarian." 110 But
this comparison is itself a gross overstatement and highly misleading.
To be sure, totalitarian regimes may make use of simplistic slogans
and lump various persons together into categories of undesirables, but
it hardly follows that every oversimplification deserves the name
"totalitarian," especially given the powerful connotations that usually
accompany this word. In Derrida's terms this comparison is in itself
an oversimplification, a "totalitarian" move that provides Derrida's
attack on de Man's critics with much more rhetorical force than it
really deserves. It would be more appropriate - and more just - to
argue that these critics do not read de Man in the proper context and
with the proper degree of charity; but this accusation, even if true, in
no way justifies the claim that, in misreading de Man, they are
reproducing the logic of totalitarian discourse.    
In fact, when we strip away its more obfuscating elements,
Derrida's identification of deconstruction with antitotalitarianism is
really better expressed in terms of deconstruction's continual
allegiance to transcendent human values, which law, language, and
convention never fully serve and always partially obscure. We
deconstruct categorical judgments because they take us further away
from truth; we deconstruct legal categories because they deviate from
     111 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended
principally at 42 U.S.C. 2000a to 2000h-6 (1988)).
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what is just. Nevertheless, a deconstruction in the service of justice
is always premised on the possibility of reconstruction - that is, on the
hope of some categorical scheme that would better articulate the
appropriate context of judgment. If we do not believe that there is a
better description, there is no point in deconstructing in the first place.
We are simply substituting one description for another, without any
assertion that one is better than another. 
Does this practice in fact presuppose a transcendent norm of
justice? We might deconstruct only in order to show that a categorical
judgment fails to live up to the norms of our particular culture or legal
system. In that case the ultimate ground of our deconstruction is to
obtain increasing fidelity to positive norms. However, such a practice
places the positive norms beyond criticism because they are the basis
of deconstructive critique. Yet one can easily imagine cases in which
this very refusal to critique positive norms would itself be totalitarian.
However, to say that positive norms are inadequate - and
hence in order to deconstruct them - we must refer to values that lie
beyond the norms we are critiquing and that serve as the source of our
criticism, even if we believe that the values we wish to uphold are to
some extent realized in our culture. Suppose that we denied that we
need concern ourselves with transcendent values: Suppose we assert
that we are only interested in engaging in an "immanent" critique. In
other words, we say that we are using one aspect of our cultural
norms to critique other aspects, and therefore we need make no
reference to anything beyond the positive norms of our culture. For
example, we might use the commitment to equality expressed in the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 111 to criticize the lack of civil rights for
homosexuals in the United States. The question remains, however,
why we saw a particular aspect of our cultural practices as a worthy
basis for our critique and another aspect as unworthy. Since both are
equally aspects of our culture, culture by itself cannot serve as a norm
to decide between them.    
We might say that one is a more central feature of our cultural
norms than the other, but this leads to two different interpretations. If
something is central because it is more prevalent, we refer only to a
positive norm. Yet mere prevalence does not guarantee the worth of
     112 See supra notes 9, 15, 31-40 and accompanying text.
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a cultural practice, unless our only goal is to reinforce positive norms
for their own sake. For example, racial inequality may be central to
a regime of Jim Crow or apartheid, but this fact does not make it a
worthy basis for a critique of egalitarian norms that might exist
elsewhere in the culture. Indeed, by reinforcing the most prevalent
practices of a culture, we may reinforce its most deeply unfair
elements. On the other hand, by "central" we could mean "more
valuable" or "more just." In that case our judgment must also refer to
a transcendent conception of value or justice that informs our notion
of centrality. Thus, whenever we speak of the proper continuation of
positive norms or about deciding between alternative interpretations
of positive norms, we must eventually make use of transcendent
norms of justice. Although we may find these norms partially realized
in portions of our own culture, these inadequate articulations do not
exhaust their meaning for us.
   V. Deconstruction as a Normative Chasm
  
I want to conclude this essay by juxtaposing two different
claims. I began this essay by noting that the normative import of any
particular deconstructive argument depends largely upon what the
deconstructor chooses to deconstruct, and the values and
commitments that she brings to her act of deconstruction. As we have
seen, 112 Derrida tends to pick targets for deconstruction that
correspond to the injustices he perceives. He deconstructs
inegalitarian conceptions, but not egalitarian ones; he deconstructs the
cultural practice of apartheid and Western practices that support it,
but not arguments against apartheid; he deconstructs unfair
accusations of Paul de Man, but not those assessments which he
believes to be fair. At the same time, I have argued for a
transcendental version of deconstruction: When we employ
deconstruction to discuss questions of justice, we always refer to the
discrepancy between human law, culture, and convention, and the
human values which they articulate.    
When we put these two claims together, we arrive at a curious
problem. If deconstruction makes reference to transcendent values,
why should the results of deconstructive argument turn on the target
     113 For example, he insists that deconstruction does not
"correspond (though certain people have an interest in spreading this
confusion) to a quasi-nihilistic abdication before the ethico-politico-
juridical question of justice and before the opposition between just
and unjust." Derrida, supra note 4, at 953. But this failure of
correspondence may mean either that deconstruction - properly
employed and understood - need not lead to injustice, or that it cannot
do so. Even if people do not use deconstructive arguments to efface
the distinction between the just and the unjust, they might still use
deconstructive arguments to argue for what is unjust through
sophistical means.
     114 See, e.g., Derrida, Biodegradables, supra note 8, at 827
(rejecting the claim of a critic that deconstruction can be used for
either "fascist" or "liberal" purposes and demanding "some proof,
please, some arguments, some examples, at least one example!").
     115 See supra text accompanying notes 40-45; see also Balkin,
supra note 3, at 1613-25 (offering competing readings of a U.S.
Supreme Court opinion on parental rights).
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of our deconstruction? How is it possible that deconstructive
arguments can be wielded for contrary purposes? Why isn't
deconstructive argument always a force for good?
In the three essays I have discussed, Derrida does not deal
adequately with the many difficult questions concerning the ethics of
deconstructive argument. He is preoccupied with showing that
deconstruction is not necessarily nihilistic. 113 Nevertheless, he never
offers much of an argument for why deconstructive argument cannot
lead to contradictory normative positions or even be used to promote
injustice. In Biodegradables, he does little more than scoff at the
notion that one can use deconstruction to promote both good and evil
political regimes; he demands proof that deconstruction could ever be
used for a bad purpose. 114 This burden is easily met, however: As the
first part of this essay shows, it takes very little effort to produce
numerous examples of deconstructive arguments that point in
opposite directions. 115 In his Cardozo Law School address, Derrida
tries a different tack. He seems to suggest that any example of
deconstruction that leads to injustice is not really deconstructive, just
as no example of law is ever fully just. In his view, both
deconstruction and justice are impossible. Thus, deconstruction itself
     116 Derrida, supra note 4, at 945.
     117 Perhaps unsurprisingly, Plato was among the first philosophers
to stress this relationship; it is a principal motivation for his theory of
Forms. Cf. Seung, supra note 24, at 209-10. Nevertheless, one does
not have to accept the entire ontological baggage of the Forms to
acknowledge Plato's genius in recognizing this fundamental
inadequacy between our indeterminate values and their articulations
in the world of culture.
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can never be unjust; in fact, Derrida asserts, "Deconstruction is
justice." 116 In these passages, Derrida simply offers a mystical
equation between justice and deconstruction; he strings together
provocative metaphysical formulas but does not begin to offer a
convincing argument for them. 
 
 Nevertheless, it is possible to make sense of deconstruction's
proper relationship to justice, and, in the process, to offer a more
charitable interpretation of Derrida's rather obscure discussion. To
solve this quandary, let us distinguish between deconstructive
arguments made by human beings, which we might call the rhetorical
practice of deconstruction, and the relationship of mutual dependence
and differentiation that exists between human values and human
language, convention, and culture. In this relationship, human
conventions articulate human values but never fully capture them. Let
us call this relationship of simultaneous inadequacy and dependence
the normative chasm between inchoate human values and their
cultural articulations. 117   
What is the relationship of the rhetorical practice of
deconstructive argument to this normative chasm? When people
make deconstructive arguments about justice, they make use of this
chasm in two ways. First, their arguments implicitly rely on values
which, to some indefinite degree, transcend human conventions.
Second, their critiques partially describe the discrepancy between law,
convention, and culture and the human values of justice and truth. Yet
deconstructive arguments that make use of this normative chasm are
not themselves identical to this chasm, nor do they ever articulate it
completely. Indeed, because human values are inchoate and
indeterminate and human conventions are indefinite in their reach and
scope, the relationship between the two is doubly problematic. It may
     118 See Balkin, supra note 1, at 766.
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even be misleading to think of this normative gap as a single,
homogenous thing that any mind could ever grasp or describe as a
totality. Thus, there are two things that human law, language, and
convention fail adequately to capture: The first are the human values
on the other side of the normative chasm; the second is the chasm
itself. 
The human practice of deconstructive argument always
involves a limited use of the normative gap between value and
articulation. It is limited in two senses. First, a deconstructive
argument must always begin somewhere, at a certain place or with a
certain target. Each deconstructive argument shows the instability of
the distinctions with which it starts, and the mutual dependence and
differentiation of the conceptual oppositions it targets. Yet these
deconstructive arguments themselves must rely on distinctions and
conceptual oppositions, otherwise they could not be expressed in
language and understood by others. Furthermore, no deconstructive
argument destabilizes all of the conceptual structures in language or
culture at once; for every distinction it contests, it leaves unexamined
thousands more. Thus, every deconstructive argument fails ultimately
to offer an adequate account of the normative chasm; instead it
examines and articulates only a little part of this phenomenon, using
conceptual tools that are already symptoms and effects of this chasm.
Second, each deconstructive argument must come to an end.
It generally ends with a conclusion that a particular distinction or set
of distinctions is effaced, undecidable, or more complicated than one
had first imagined. It ends when the deconstructor believes that she
has reached an appropriate degree of enlightenment from the process
of deconstructive argument. 118 For example, Derrida ends his essay
on de Man by showing that de Man's situation is more complicated
than his critics thought. So deconstruction as practiced by human
beings always arrives at a conclusion in two senses of the word - both
an end and a result of reasoning. Yet the decision to stop and assess
the conclusions of one's argument, to state them as conclusions - in
both senses of that word -leaves unspoken the many further steps that
could be taken. These additional steps could lead to a partial or even
a complete transformation of the conclusions just arrived at. Thus,
from another perspective, the conclusion of a deconstructive
     119 In other words, if Derrida were correct that Deconstruction is
justice because both are impossible of attainment, then
Deconstruction would not only be justice, but also beauty, wisdom,
and temperance, as none of these virtues is perfectly realized in this
world. A more appropriate view would be Derrida's assertion that
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argument is a conclusion in neither sense of the word: for it does not
end the possible lines of deconstructive argument, nor does it lead to
a fixed and determinate result.    
We thus obtain the curious result that the discrepancy between
value and articulation that makes each human practice of
deconstruction possible is itself indescribable through the finite
rhetorical practice of deconstruction. One might try to imagine a
God's-eye point of view from which all the mutual differentiations
and dependences, all the uncanny reversals and undoings of human
conceptual structures, could be understood and appreciated. But such
a view is not possible for any human intelligence. Thus, the rhetorical
practice of deconstructive argument is always inadequate to express
the predicament of human culture that makes this sort of argument
possible. 
It is possible that, when Derrida speaks of "Deconstruction"
in his more mystical pronouncements, he has in mind something like
this normative chasm, this essential inadequation between
transcendent human values and human culture. If so, then no human
practice of deconstructive argument is "Deconstruction," because no
argument ever fully describes the relationship between value and
articulation. Indeed, such a complete description would be
impossible. It would not follow, however, that "Deconstruction" itself
was impossible, only a fully adequate account of it. So Derrida's
equation between Deconstruction and justice is flawed. Justice is
"impossible" only in the sense that one never finds a fully and
categorically just act in this world. Yet "Deconstruction" is not
impossible, even though one never finds a fully deconstructive
argument. The relationship of mutual dependence and differentiation
that exists between culture and value is not impossible; it is the case.
Moreover, it is simply not true, as Derrida asserts, that
Deconstruction is justice. This assertion is a confusion of the
normative chasm between culture and value with a particular inchoate
and indefinite human value. Derrida's mystical formula simply
obscures a valuable insight. 119
"deconstruction takes place in the interval that separates the
undeconstructibility of justice from the deconstructibility of droit
(authority, legitimacy, and so on)." Derrida, supra note 4, at 945 (first
emphasis added). In other words, Deconstruction is the gap itself,
rather than one side or another of this gap.
If by Deconstruction Derrida means this normative gap,
Deconstruction would not even be an activity of human beings.
Instead Deconstruction would simply be the case that there is a
fundamental inadequation. Thus, elsewhere Derrida suggests that
"deconstruction takes place, it is an event that does not await the
deliberation, consciousness, or organization of a subject, or even of
modernity. It deconstructs it-self." Letter from Jacques Derrida to a
Japanese Friend 4, reprinted in Derrida and Differance 1-5 (David
Wood & Robert Bernasconi eds., 1988) hereinafter Letter from
Derrida. This "it," Derrida insists, "is not ... an impersonal thing that
is opposed to some egological subjectivity." Id. It is not the result of
a subject applying a force to an object. It would perhaps be better to
say simply that "Deconstruction happens," or "There is
Deconstruction".
     120 See Letter from Derrida, supra note 119, at 3.
     121 Derrida, supra note 4, at 945.
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This account of Deconstruction also explains two other
puzzling Derridean statements. The first is Derrida's insistence that
Deconstruction is not a method or a technique. 120 The second is his
assertion that Deconstruction itself, like justice, is not
deconstructible. 121    
Derrida's repeated denial that deconstruction is a method or a
practice -and therefore, unlike these denials, not repeatable - has
struck many as strange and possibly a clever way of dodging
criticism: if deconstruction is not a method, then only a certain elect -
presumably Jacques Derrida and his followers - can tell whether a
given argument is truly deconstructive or not. They can thus disown
all examples that put their practices in a bad light. Whether or not
Derrida has sought to shield himself from criticism through
obfuscation, there is another, more charitable way of accounting for
his statements. Derrida's insistence on separating deconstruction from
"method" is consistent with a view of Deconstruction as a normative
chasm that cannot adequately be captured by any human rhetorical
     122 A similar argument would apply to justice. Only human culture,
law, and convention are deconstructible because, and to the extent
that, they depend upon but vary from inchoate human values. A
human value like justice would not be deconstructible, although any
particular articulation of it would be, just as the normative gap -
Deconstruction itself - would not be deconstructible, although any
particular articulation of it would be.
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practice of deconstructive argument. This chasm is not part of any
conventional practice of deconstruction; rather, it is what these
conventions imperfectly articulate. The human practices of
deconstructive argument are conventional, repeatable, transmissible,
and hence deconstructible. In contrast, Deconstruction - which is the
case that there is an indescribable inadequacy between human values
and their articulations - is not a convention, and hence it is not
deconstructible. 122   
Nevertheless, it follows that deconstructive arguments are
surely part of a practice or convention of deconstructive rhetoric. This
claim has two consequences. First, the practice of deconstructive
argument is as deconstructible as any other set of conventional
understandings and practices. This resolves the question left
unanswered earlier in this essay. We noted that if deconstruction
argument were a repeatable rhetorical practice, expressible through
repeatable linguistic signs and conventions, it would be subject to
"ideological drift": The insertion of deconstructive arguments into
new and different contexts would result in arguments with widely
varying political and moral valences. This would mean both (1) that
deconstructive arguments could be used for a variety of different
political purposes, depending on the context in which they were
offered; and (2) that any normative uses of deconstruction would
themselves be subject to further deconstructive critique. 
These conclusions are fully warranted. Deconstructive
argument, like all other forms of rhetoric, is a communal practice
existing in various human institutions. It can be - and is - learned and
taught, copied and parodied, understood and misunderstood. It can be
- and is - the subject of countless Ph.D. theses and books. It is
repeatable and transmissible, like all other features of human life
existing in and articulated through human language and human social
conventions. It is therefore subject to the vagaries of iterability and
     123 It might seem strange for me to note the obvious - that people
learn to deconstruct in departments of comparative literature, that
theses on deconstruction that repeatedly apply deconstructive
arguments are produced in great numbers, that these theses are
criticized or applauded as good and bad examples, that people can
apply the varieties of deconstructive arguments they find in certain
texts to later problems, and that other members of the relevant
interpretive community of deconstructive scholars agree that these
later applications are also deconstructive. I emphasize these features -
the repeatability and the communal nature of deconstructive practice -
precisely because Jacques Derrida has always been so uncomfortable
with such statements, leading as they do to the conclusion that there
is, after all, a deconstructive method, that can be taught, practiced,
and repeatedly applied in new situations. At the same time, Derrida
has been quick to point out that certain arguments are misstatements
of deconstruction, that others are poorly performed versions of
deconstruction, and that particular deconstructive readings are
themselves subject to further deconstruction. My theory of
Deconstruction as a normative chasm shows how one might
consistently hold these positions; nevertheless it commits Derrida -
and other deconstructionists - to something like a transcendental
account of deconstruction.
     124 See Aristotle, The "Art" of Rhetoric, Book I, 1.12 (John H.
Freese trans., Loeb Classical Library 1982).
     125 See id.
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ideological drift. It is deconstructible. 123   
Furthermore, because deconstructive argument is a practice of
rhetoric, it is hardly surprising that it can be used for good or for ill.
Like all rhetoric, deconstructive argument is a form of persuasive
advocacy. As Aristotle pointed out, the advocate always takes large
portions of her audience's beliefs for granted and does not try to
contest them. 124 Instead, she focuses on specific questions and makes
use of beliefs and attitudes that she and her audience hold in common.
125 Some of these beliefs may be only partially correct; others may
even be the result of unthinking acceptance of community norms.
Nevertheless, the advocate refrains from attacking them because they
actually assist her in making her argument.    
In this regard the human practice of deconstructive argument
is much the same as other forms of persuasive rhetoric. It begins
     126 4 Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria, Book XII, 1.1 (H.E. Butler
trans., Loeb Classical Library 1961).
     127 See id., 1.3-.13.
     128 A recent example is Richard Weisberg, Poethics 5-15 (1992),
which argues that unjust judicial opinions usually display rhetorical
flaws.
     129 Quintilian himself recognized that "common opinion is
practically unanimous in rejecting this view." Quintilian, supra note
126, 1.14. His claim is all the more puzzling given that he was
involved in the training of lawyers, who are taught to argue both sides
of a case with equal ability. However, Quintilian's position was
motivated by a much more plausible one: He believed that the proper
use of rhetoric could only be guaranteed by a rigorous moral
education that produced a good character; hence he felt that rhetorical
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somewhere and ends somewhere. It takes certain features of culture
and convention for granted and uses them to deconstruct others. Thus,
people can use deconstructive argument for different purposes
because they can begin their critiques with different texts or different
features of the same text. Because the normative chasm between
value and articulation applies to all aspects of human culture and
convention, there will always be some discrepancy or instability to
deconstruct in every conceptual structure and in every normative
position. Thus, depending upon where one starts and where one ends,
one can put into question different distinctions and conceptual
oppositions that support or justify different interpretations or different
actions. 
If deconstructive argument is a form of rhetorical practice,
then the ethical status of deconstruction is very much like the
question of the relationship of rhetoric to ethics. The latter question
has been the focus of a great historical debate. Quintilian, the great
Roman theorist of rhetoric, claimed that good oratory is a good
person speaking well. 126 This statement might be read to suggest that
well-done oratory must also serve a just objective and, conversely,
that arguments motivated by an unjust purpose or a bad character will
always manifest poor rhetorical style. 127 Although this position has
had its adherents throughout history, 128 many people consider it
wishful thinking. 129 A more common position on the ethics of
and moral education must occur together. See id., 2.1-.2.
     130 Plato, Gorgias, in Collected Dialogues, supra note 20, at 229
(W.D. Woodhead trans., 1953).
     131 Id. at 245-57.
     132 Cf. Aristotle, supra note 124, Book I, 1.10 (offering arguments
for the utility of rhetoric).
     133 As George Kennedy reminds us, "Aristotle was the first person
to recognize clearly that rhetoric as an art of communication was
morally neutral, that it could be used either for good or ill." George
A. Kennedy, Introduction to Aristotle On Rhetoric ix (George A.
Kennedy trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1991).
     134 Aristotle, supra note 124, Book I, 1.12.
     135 See id., 1.13.
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rhetoric is that of Plato, who compared rhetoric to cosmetics, flattery,
and the baking of pastries. 130 Plato argued that rhetoric misleads
people by giving certain positions an artificial appeal, just as a pastry
chef gives food an artificial appeal that is undeserved given its lack
of nutritional value. 131 Thus, far from always serving just ends,
rhetoric was a device inherently designed to falsify and obfuscate.  
Aristotle struck a middle position between these two
extremes. He emphasized that rhetoric is a useful and important
feature of public  life. 132 But its publicity means that it can be used
for many different purposes. 133 It is surely wrong to employ rhetoric
for evil ends; nevertheless, it is worthwhile to be able to argue both
sides of a case precisely so that one can better respond to the unjust
use of rhetoric when one encounters it. 134 Although one can use
rhetoric for good or for ill, the same can be said of many useful
things, like strength, health, wealth, and strategic expertise. 135
Rhetoric's ability to be employed for both good and wicked purposes
should lead us to recognize the responsibility that each of us has for
the arguments that he or she makes. Each of us - Derrida and de Man
included - may become skillful at persuasion. Yet with this skill
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comes responsibility. Like all other kinds of rhetoric, we must use the
practice of deconstruction responsibly, because the practice itself will
not guarantee the purity of our motives or the goodness of our actions.
 
   Conclusion
 
The encounter between deconstruction and justice has
changed both parties; yet, of the two, deconstruction appears to be the
more transformed. If deconstructive practice is to be of any use to the
question of justice, it must become a transcendental deconstruction.
It must exchange the logic of the infinite for that of the indefinite. It
must act in the service of human values that go beyond culture,
convention, and law. It must recognize the chasm that differentiates
human value from articulated conceptions of it, and it must identify
Deconstruction with that chasm. Finally, one must understand
deconstructive practice as a rhetorical practice that employs
Deconstruction but is not identical to it. Because deconstructive
practice is a practice, it is repeatable, teachable, and alterable like any
other human convention. Because it is rhetorical, it can be used for
good or for ill. 
There is one more transformation yet to come. Understanding
the subject of justice must lead us to reunderstand the subject. Derrida
speaks repeatedly of the "infinite demand" of justice. But his
metaphor obscures a central point: Justice does not demand anything,
for justice is not a person that could demand. Justice is a human
value. It is a value lodged in the hearts of human beings. It is people
who demand justice, and who demand it of one another. 
Derrida's placement of justice in the role of the grammatical
subject - the subject who demands justice - obscures the fact that the
real subject of justice is, and always has been, not a concept, not a
grammatical subject, but a person. This subject of justice is someone
who can experience justice and injustice, who can feel wronged or
vindicated, harmed or helped, who can understand that she or
someone else has been treated justly or unjustly.
There is something uncannily appropriate in Derrida's way of
expressing himself, replacing the individual subject with a grand
abstraction. Deconstruction first came to public attention in the wake
     136 On French antihumanism, see Kate Soper, Humanism and Anti-
Humanism (1986).
 
     137 See, e.g., Derrida, supra note 75, at 25 ("The meaning of
meaning ... is infinite implication, the indefinite referral of signifier
to signifier.").
     138 2 Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Pierce 228 (Charles
Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1960).
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of structuralism, an intellectual movement that effaced the human
subject and sought to explain it as an effect or byproduct of language
and culture. These attempts to dissolve the human subject were in
turn part of a larger tendency in French thought toward
antihumanism. 136 Derrida broke with structuralism in several
respects, but not in this one. He adopted the largely antihumanist
assumptions then reigning in French intellectual life, as well as the
unfortunate tendency in Continental philosophy to make grammatical
subjects out of philosophical predicates.   
 In fact, there has always been the temptation in Derrida's
work to do without the individual human subject, to speak of
Deconstruction, but not of deconstructors; of signs, but not those who
signify; of meanings, but not those who mean; of justice, but not of
people who value the just. Especially in his early works, one
sometimes finds the suggestion that there are simply signs pointing
to each other, without the necessary support of any human
intelligence. 137   
Nevertheless, this raises a serious difficulty. How can there be
signs without subjects to understand them? After all, as Charles
Sanders Pierce defined it, a sign is something that stands for
something else to somebody in some relation or context. 138 Without
the "somebody" to make or understand the sign, signification
becomes impossible, and Derrida's philosophical project falls apart.
Thus, although antihumanism and semiotics are often identified with
each other, in fact they are mutually incompatible.
   One way out of this difficulty is to postulate a Transcendental
Subject who does all of the work of meaning and understanding all
signs. This is the Hegelian solution; it projects human intelligence
     139 Cf. Richard Harland, Superstructuralism: The Philosophy of
Structuralism and Post-Structuralism 146-54 (1987); T.K. Seung,
Structuralism and Hermeneutics 256-57 (1982).
     140 See Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena 147 (David B.
Allison trans., Northwestern Univ. Press 1973) (1967-1968). Of
course, the words "effect" and "determination" must be put in quotes
because the very notions of "cause" and "effect" become inadequate
in Derrida's approach. Id.
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onto a single great Mind. The second solution, which Derrida has
occasionally toyed with over the years, is semiotic materialism. 139 It
argues that signs are material traces or are formed from the
juxtapositions of material elements. Thus, a sign does not need to be
understood by anyone in order to exist as a sign; its semiotic character
is ensured by its relationship to other signs without the mediation of
a consciousness. Moreover, instead of explaining signs in terms of
consciousness, as Pierce did, we explain consciousness in terms of
signs. So the self becomes an "effect" or "determination" of a system
of differentiated signs. 140 Neither of these solutions is completely
satisfactory. A third and better solution is simply to abandon
antihumanism and to reemphasize the importance of individual
subjects in the creation of a culture that in turn creates them. 
   Deconstruction's confrontation with questions of justice
presses this third alternative upon us; confronting the question of
justice raises the problem of the subject with renewed urgency.
Derrida wants to speak of responsibility and choice; he wants to say
that de Man's critics are unfair and that de Man was a good and
generous person. He wants to assert that each of us has an infinite
responsibility to the Other. Yet, in order to speak in this way, he
needs subjects who are response-able - who can make choices and can
be praised or blamed, rewarded or held responsible for them. His
arguments about justice become incoherent unless he assumes the
existence of individuals who are more than the products of cultural
writing, and who can bear a responsibility to others, whether this
responsibility is infinite or indefinite. 
Thus, the antihumanist vocabulary that has for so long been
associated with deconstruction must be abandoned when
deconstruction confronts questions of justice in the real world. Once
again, it is interesting to look at the treatment of the subject in
     141 See, e.g., Derrida, Biodegradables, supra note 8, at 825-28.
     142Drucilla Cornell reaches a similar conclusion in her study of the
ethics of deconstruction. See Cornell, supra note 75, at 149; cf.
Binder, supra note 75, at 1383 ("There can be no right of self-
determination if there is no self.").
     143These arguments are further elaborated in J.M. Balkin, Cultural
Software, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. (forthcoming 1994).
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Derrida's essays about Paul de Man. In these essays, Derrida jettisons
the antihumanist rhetoric of his earlier writings. He speaks of
individual actions, individual meanings, and individual
responsibilities. 141 Indeed, when Derrida discusses the ethical
responsibilities of de Man and his critics in these writings, one could
easily be forgiven for mistaking his discourse with familiar liberal
notions of autonomy and free will.    
The subject who emerges from deconstruction's encounter
with justice may not be in all respects the relatively autonomous
subject of traditional political theory; nevertheless, she is a person
who can choose and hence bear the responsibility for her choices.142
Deconstruction's encounter with justice shows how urgently the
concept of a socially constructed subject needs revision. The
challenge is to integrate deconstructive insights about language and
meaning with the reality of individual subjects and the claims of
individual responsibility. The transcendental conception of
deconstruction can prove helpful in this endeavor. It argues that
human beings articulate their values through culture and conventions.
But this articulation is by no means uniformly limiting. To the
contrary, the articulation of human values through language and
culture simultaneously empowers individuals. Although the cultural
articulation of human values fails fully to capture these values, at the
same time it opens up possibilities for action and hence for
responsibility. It creates degrees of moral and practical freedom. 143
Thus, contrary to antihumanist assumptions, culture and language do
not efface human autonomy but are the conditions of its very
possibility.    
In one sense, it was inevitable that deconstructionists would
have to rethink deconstruction's relationship to the subject the
moment they became concerned with questions of justice. The notion
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of responsibility toward others presupposes people who can be
responsible. The idea of an indefinite demand presupposes people to
whom this demand can be addressed. The attempt to deconstruct
systems of law or legal doctrines presupposes concern about the
people unjustly affected by them. Finally, the transcendental
conception of deconstruction inevitably leads us back to the
individual subject. For this conception locates justice not as a
determinate, unchanging Idea in Heaven but as a value or urge within
the human soul; hence the importance of paying attention to the
person possessing that soul.
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